> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>> >
>> > You don't think paramecium behaviour could be modelled on a computer?
>> >
>> > Stathis Papaiaonnou
>> A paramecium can behave like it's perceiving something. I haven't
>> observed
>> it myself but I have spoken to people who have and they say they have
>> behaviours which betray some sort of awareness beyond the scope of their
>> boundary.
> Perception can occur *at* a boundary. Touch is perception.

No. The sensing occurs at the boundary. The sensation is manufactured in
your brain and projected to appear as if it came from the location of the
touch. This is empirically proven fact (for decades now).

>> A teeny paramecium-sized primitive external world model. A teeny
>> bit of adaptive behaviour.
>> So a computer model?....
>> A) that included a model of those aspects of the physics participating
>> in
>> what the paramecium could have as experiences.
>> B) That included all the molecular pathways (cilia molecules, the lot)
>> C) that included a model of the response to the perceptual physics
>> D) That included a model of the environment of the paramecium
>> would be pretty good. But the model would not be having experiences.
> Because...?
>> There's the age old distinction between [modelling perfectly] and [the
>> perfect model]. The former aims at "realistic replication". The latter
>> aims at "suited to task". I think you could get pretty close to it
>> behaviourally. Maybe indistinguishable.
>> The way to test it? Make the model drive a nano-robot paramecium shell.
>> Then let it live with real paramecium. Then expose both to novelty and
>> see
>> what the differences are.
> Why should there be any? Any AI worthy of the name will learn
> form experience. Doing so at  a human level has not been
> achieved, doing so a the paramecium level might be a lot easier.
>> I don't think any amount of detail will ever make the model or the
>> computer it is running on have experiences...
> That's an opinion, not an argument.

"The Totally Blind Zombie Homunculus Room Experiment"

to come...

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