Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be "me"? How much fidelity is required for Bruno's argument? I think not much.

The argument does not depend at all of the level of fidelity. Indeed I make clear (as much as possible) that comp is equivalent to the belief there is a level of substitution of myself (3-person) such that I (1-person) survive a functional substitution done at that level. Then I show no machine can know what is her level of substitution (and thus has to bet or guess about it).

This is also the reason why comp is not jeopardized by the idea that the environment is needed: just put the environment in the definition of my "generalized brain".

Imagine someone who say that his brain is the entire galaxy, described at the level of all interacting quantum strings. This can be captured by giant (to say the least) but finite, rational complex matrices. Of course the thought experiment with the "yes doctor" will look very non-realist, but *in fine*, all what is needed (for the reversal) is that the Universal Dovetailer get through the state of my generalized brain, and the UD will get it even if my "state" is the state of the whole galaxy, or more.

If it happens that my state is the galaxy state AND that the galaxy state cannot be captured in a finite ('even giant) way(*), then we are just out of the scope of the comp- reasoning. This is possible because comp may be wrong.


(*) Note this *is* very speculative. Mathematically we can study non-computationalist "physical realities" but there is no clues at all that "our" physical neighborhood would contradict comp.


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