Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :

And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be "me"? How much fidelity is required for Bruno's argument? I think not much.

The argument does not depend at all of the level of fidelity. Indeed I make clear (as much as possible) that comp is equivalent to the belief there is a level of substitution of myself (3-person) such that I (1-person) survive a functional substitution done at that level. Then I show no machine can know what is her level of substitution (and thus has to bet or guess about it).

I think you are using "level" in a different sense than I meant above.  I meant 
"degree of fidelity".  I was contemplating, for example, a copy at the level (your 
meaning) of neurons, which was of low fidelity; so that the copy resembled me in, for example, the 
same degree that I, at age 67, resemble myself at age 30.

Brent Meeker

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