Bruno Marchal writes:
 
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :>> > OK, but that means 
> "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > "illusion" of their 
> continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > their underpinning. But I 
> don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > process as contemplated in the 
> UD can provide that continuity. It was > > my understanding that it assumed 
> consciousness could be provided by a > > series of disjoint states.> > Yes. 
> But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > related 
> by a computation for making sense.> > So it makes no sense to say that a 
> sequence of number is a computation. > You have to fix a "universal 
> environment". Let us fix once and for all > a godel numbering. Then it is 
> only relative to some universal number > that a sequence of number can be 
> counted as a computation.
This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, then you set 
their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How can you "fix once and 
for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do you exclude all the other 
possible interpretations? 
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > computation 
> we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to > take all 
> equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > universal 
> number.> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > 
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > related 
> to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > includes the 
> infinity of computations describing finer grained > histories with respect to 
> our comp level of substitution.> > Consciousness is typically a first person 
> notion. Strictly speaking it > cannot be associated to one third person 
> computation. Only this one can > be described by a sequence of discrete 
> states (more or less arbitrarily > from a choice of a universal 
> number/system). First person consciousness > is associated with a uncountable 
> ("continuous") third person > computation.> > That is why all notion of 
> self-correctness can make sense only > relatively to the most *probable* 
> computational histories. OK?> > > Bruno> > > 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > 
> _________________________________________________________________
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