Bruno Marchal writes: > Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :>> > OK, but that means > "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > "illusion" of their > continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > their underpinning. But I > don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > process as contemplated in the > UD can provide that continuity. It was > > my understanding that it assumed > consciousness could be provided by a > > series of disjoint states.> > Yes. > But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > related > by a computation for making sense.> > So it makes no sense to say that a > sequence of number is a computation. > You have to fix a "universal > environment". Let us fix once and for all > a godel numbering. Then it is > only relative to some universal number > that a sequence of number can be > counted as a computation. This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, then you set their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How can you "fix once and for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do you exclude all the other possible interpretations? > Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > computation > we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to > take all > equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > universal > number.> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > > computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > related > to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > includes the > infinity of computations describing finer grained > histories with respect to > our comp level of substitution.> > Consciousness is typically a first person > notion. Strictly speaking it > cannot be associated to one third person > computation. Only this one can > be described by a sequence of discrete > states (more or less arbitrarily > from a choice of a universal > number/system). First person consciousness > is associated with a uncountable > ("continuous") third person > computation.> > That is why all notion of > self-correctness can make sense only > relatively to the most *probable* > computational histories. OK?> > > Bruno> > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > _________________________________________________________________ Get connected - Use your Hotmail address to sign into Windows Live Messenger now. http://get.live.com/messenger/overview --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

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