Hello Stephen,

Le 22-févr.-07, à 02:08, Stephen Paul King a écrit : > > Hi Bruno, > > I read all of your posts with interest and after reading your > responce > to Hal's latest post, where you make a statement about your theory, I > again > have a question: How do you account for the multiplicity of "minds" > (each > having a different "PoV of the "physical world") such that your theory > is > not just a very sophisticated version of Solipsism? In the thought experiments (UDA), the mutiplicity of minds, or the possibility of such a multiplicity, is given by the duplication of population of individuals, and the fact that people there can share a notion of first person indeterminacy. Just imagine the whole of belgians duplicated into Washington and Moscow. They can make bets! I usually refer to this with the notion of first person plural indeterminacy. In the lobian interview, the question is more difficult. First person plural is given, approximately, by the Bp & Dp (provable p and consistent p) person point of view. This gives an arithmetical quantum logic. But quantum logics are known to be insufficient to define a natural tensor product or entanglement, needed for "entangling" the computations. Thanks to relation between knot theory and quantum information, I begin to see more clearly how QM escapes solipsism, and this provides hints how comp will solve it, or being refuted by not allowing it. Knots and braids seems to me to be the best intermediary structures between quantum realities and numbers. But for the "qualium" realities (the person and their inner observation), the logic of self-reference seems to me the only way to keep them "intact" ... > Is the word "head" (in your statement) a derivative/representation > of > some aspect of the "measure" you mention in your papers and if so how? I don't think so. "head" was used a bit poetically, to show up the relation between the machine self-reference logics and the inward looking of the mystics (like Plotinus). Your "head" is in your "head" too :-) I assure you that if comp leads to solipsism, I will take that as a definitive refutation of comp. But this should not be confused with the problem of the number of persons. Even if there is really only one person, it would not mean solipsism is true. It would mean we are all the same person (in different context), not that "I" am the only one. With comp the number of first person is an open problem. Bon week-end, Bruno PS My paper on Plotinus I talked about has been accepted. http://www.amsta.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/cie07.contr.html About my other paper relating knots and the Bp & Dp stases, I talked about too, well, ... I found an error by myself, and I am a bit stucked, although I have just made some progress. I have understood that if physics is really derivable from arithmetical introspection (and this follows from comp by UDA), then it should be easier to derive a topological quantum universal machine in the neighborhood of almost all universal machine, than physics per se .... The relation between G and Z (corresponding to Plotinus' mirror between intelligible matter and the divine intellect) gives rise to a structure relating braids and quantum information, but a bit too trivial. Not enough for getting quantum entanglement, nor quantum universality, and still less the first person plural notion you ask me for. I hope this comes from my incompetence, not a symptom of a comp solipsism! http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---