Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
> > There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
> > infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is
> > zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky
> > dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about
> > and once you are that fantastically improbable person,
> In other words, "That's just the way it is.", which comports with my
> complaint that such theories are empty.
> Brent Meeker
> >it becomes a
> > certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future
> > versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person
> > perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global
> > impossibility a local certainty.
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being
> the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like
> waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom
> overnight without there being any lottery. We could say "that's just the
> way it is", but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as
> well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that
> you and every other particular thing exist.
It's no explanation either. It's just "Everything exists and what you
experience is just what you experience." which Occam's razor trimes to "What
you experience is just what you experience".
>The only thing that needs
> ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than
> something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience
> could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that
> would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia
> can't not run.
But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or
Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a
much smaller "everything").
And how do things "run" in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as
well as epistemic ones?
"An explanation that could explain anything, fails to explain at all."
>That's highly speculative, of course: maybe the brain
> will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe someone will come up
> with a formulation of computationalism which defeats
> Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical
> Universe without ultimate explanation.
> Stathis Papaioannou
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