Le 21-mars-07, à 17:41, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> >>> What are those relations? Is it a matter of the provenance of the >>> numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD? Or is an >>> inherent relation like being relatively prime? >> >> >> It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number >> of a proof of f, etc. > > I didn't think godel numbering was unique? If I just cite a number, > like 12345678987654321, is it either the godel number of a proof or > not? The whole point of Godel's proof is that, exactly like you can define "prime" in the language of Peano Arithmetic PA (or weaker non lobian entity like Robinson Arithmetic), you *can* define "being the godel number of a proof by PA" *in* PA. In all situation, when we are using a language we have to agree on some convention. Even the question "is the number 12345678987654321 prime or not" presuppose the conventional use of base ten position notation for number and the arithmetical definition of primeness. The same occurs for the notion of arithmetical provability. Of course the finite string "12345678987654321" could be a godel number of a proof or not depending of the way you represent the variable or the quantifier or the connector in term of numbers, but the *string* "12345678987654321" will represent a prime number or not according to the way you represent decimal numbers in Pean Arithmetic. It is just because we already agree, since high-school, on conventional notation for number that you can directly talk about the *number* 123456787654321". If we would have learn in high school some canonical way to represent proof (in PA) by numbers, like those used to explain to PA what a proof is, I would have been able to say yes or no directly. Now, concerning Peano Arithmetic (PA), obviously (ask if not) 12345678987654321 is NOT the godel number of a proof of f (independently of any choiçce of proof representation). This is because PA is consistent, so no number can represent a proof of a falsity f. And a lobian machine like ZF can prove that. Note that, although Stathis defends many argument which are going in the direction of the ultimate consequence of comp, I do agree with some critics you are doing here and there. To believe that the observer moment OM are disconnected is perhaps a remnant ASSA thought (Absolute Self Sampling Assumption). Let us try to be a little more specific. From a computational point of view, a computation can be considered equivalent with a proof of an arithmetical statement having the shape "it exists a number having this or that decidable property", that is "En P(n)" (it exists a n such that P(n)). So the universal dovetailer infinite execution is equivalent with the set of true Sigma1 sentences together with their proofs. So we can define easily a notion of atomical (primitive) third person "Observer Moment" by them. I put OM in quotes, because strictly speaking OM are conceived as first person experience and not as third person computational states. The UD Argument does force us to take those distinction into account. In particular it shows that, to predict anything physical, among other things, we have to define a notion of first person plural indeterminacy, bearing on the OMs as seen by a machine itself embedded in UD*. What happens is that each internal view, or hypostases, like the first plural person points of view, are defining a non trivial (thanks to Godel & Co.) mathematical and quasi geometrical structure on the OMs. That is each hypostases relate the OMs. They single out arithmetical relations in between the OMs. They remains disconnected, in a sense, like the numbers themselves can be considered disconnected. But of course, numbers are connected to each other by the usual arithmetical relations (definable in term of sums and products), and when the internal points of view are taken into account, we got for each of them a collection of different connections. If you recall some of my older post, the three primary hypostases rise Kripke multiverses, and the secondary (material, physical, natuiral) hypostases rise Scot-Montague sort of continuum topological multiverses, where the OMs appears to be as connected as "points" on continuous manifolds. Now if comp is correct, it is expected that the relations between the OMs, from some first person point of view, restricted to the atomical Sigma1 propositions (by the UDA) gives rise to the laws of physics, defined by what is invariant for all observer point of views (arguably given by the third or fourth or fifth "hypostases"). Those are indeed the one which technically give purely arithmetical interpretation of Quantum Logic, the real signification of which remains to be seen (to be sure). The lobian machine already gives some clues that a *physical* computation has to be given by a unitary transformation (and thus a solution of the SWE). I don't obtain quantum entanglement, because I am still unable to recover arithmetical tensor products. This is a bit ironical, giving that "non locality" (a typical feature of quantum entanglement) is the easiest consequence about the physical world that we can derive from UDA, but apparently, when interviewing the lobian machine, it appears to be rather well hidden. Obviously, the comp-physics is not yet as elaborated than current modern physics. But thanks to the fundamental difference between G and G*, inherited by most "material (first person plural) intensional (modal) variant" of it, the lobian interview does not eliminate the mind or the first person views, with all their un-communicable sensations and qualia. here the comp physics is in advanced compared to the physicists who, in majority, are still attaching their feet to the primary Aristotelian matter bullet. To be sure, I love Aristotle. His theology is enough precise to be falsified. And, as I explained in my last (SIENA) paper, Plotinus theory of Matter is really the theory of Aristotle reconsidered in the Platonic theology. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---