Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
> 
>>
>> Thank you Bruno!
>>
>> You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
>> illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
>> to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
>> comp and see where it leads.
>>
>> It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
>> of
>> anything that is "interesting" in all this, which rather seems to be 
>> the
>> flavour of the new millennium.
>>
>> Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
>> to
>> pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
>> of
>> concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
>> But
>> what I am thinking about is this bit:
>>
>> 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
>> the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the
>> infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
>> the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
>> the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
>> self-continuation.
>>
>>  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
>> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
>> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
>> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
>> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
>> What
>> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
>> infinite regression.
> 
> 
> 
> With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between 
> numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
> level of those relations. 

What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, 
e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an inherent relation 
like being relatively prime?

Brent Meeker


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