Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit : > >> >> Thank you Bruno! >> >> You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of >> illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire >> to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* >> comp and see where it leads. >> >> It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties >> of >> anything that is "interesting" in all this, which rather seems to be >> the >> flavour of the new millennium. >> >> Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems >> to >> pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage >> of >> concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. >> But >> what I am thinking about is this bit: >> >> 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict >> the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the >> infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at >> the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute >> the statistics bearing on all consistent first person >> self-continuation. >> >> A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation >> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the >> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n >> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' >> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. >> What >> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another >> infinite regression. > > > > With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between > numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the > level of those relations.
What are those relations? Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD? Or is an inherent relation like being relatively prime? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
