On Jun 10, 1:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Up to here comp basically agree (modulo misunderstanding of my part, > sure). > I mean that what you say is not just consistent with comp (which is not > a lot after Godel: even inconsistency is consistent with comp!) but > probably near truth.
Phew! This will help with what follows, I hope. > Well, perhaps OK, unless by field you assume geometry at the start. > (Geometry like physics is secondary with comp). > You could perhaps elaborate of what you mean by field. In this case by 'field' I simply mean a self-asserting (i.e. primitive) subjective ground (in my view equating to the least we can say about existence per se) conceived as logically prior to any differentiation. Thereafter we and all phenomena (including geometry) emerge by some self-motivated action of symmetry breaking (e.g. vibrating strings, COMP?). Field may well be the wrong word. > Careful: comp cannot equate consciousness and computation. It can only > "equate" consciousness with higher order emergent modality (emergent on > a continuum of computations). Yes, I agree, in the sense of 'reflexive self-consciousness'. I meant rather that no consciousness of whatever sort can be associated with purely 'computational' processes within a 'physical computer', as opposed to those actions that emerge 'organically' from self-acting processes of symmetry breaking. In my scheme, the sense-action that we experience as conscious subjects (and that of everything else we observe) must inherit its awareness ('sense') and its causal power ('action') directly from fundamental self-sensing and self-acting symmetry-breaking. > > The reason is that computational > > 'causation' depends on the introjection of 'rules' from a context > > external to the computed 'world', > > I don't see why. My use of the term 'self' here is intended (Occamishly) to halt explanatory regression, and this is why we must not rely on superadded 'rules' coming from 'outside the system' (if so, we must go 'further out' to incorporate them). 'Computation', in the sense of the programmed action of a 'physical computer', exists only at a metaphorical level, one that we *impute* to the behaviour of a system, rather than one which emerges from its intrinsic sense-action. In this sense, the 'rules of programmed behaviour' are introjected from our mental context, which is *external* to the computer itself. > > and hence loses contact both with > > intrinsic causal self-motivation and the fundamental linkage of felt- > > sense and action. > > You are quick here ... Have I slowed down at all? What I'm saying is that as layers of phenomena emerge self-actingly and self-sensingly (self-graspingly?), a distinction must always be made between what is an 'organic' emergent - which can be the basis for quasi-independent sensing and acting, inherited directly from the fundamental level - and what is an imputed or metaphorical narrative - meaning it exists merely as a model *within* an organic emergent. In that sense it has 'lost contact' with the direct sense-action from which all higher-level sensing and action emerge. All the content of our consciousness exists in the form of such narratives, models or metaphors - my *model* of 'Bruno' doesn't have independent consciousness *as such*. Likewise, a 'program' (whether intended by a programmer, or imputed to random activity) is merely a mental introject imposed *by us* on organic action whose intrinsic felt-sense is independent of this interpretation. If you'll bear with me, Bruno, it may be possible to reconcile my scheme with AR+COMP. The 'realism' of AR posits that everything real (necessarily including the subjectively real) emerges from what is axiomatically intrinsic to AR. ISTM then that the self-sensing, self- acting process of differentiation or symmetry-breaking looks like the detailed working-out of AR's 'active potential' through COMP. I really feel that much of this is an implicit aspect of your scheme, because, by analogy with my argument above, AR+COMP *must* be (Occamishly) self-sensing, self-acting and self-justifying so that we who are posited to emerge from it can inherit precisely those characteristics. Else, we would have nothing left but a perversely incoherent appeal to something 'external' to this universe of explanation. If one uses 'computation' in the sense merely of the behaviour of a 'physical' computer (already a higher-level emergent in either scheme), then purely metaphorical interpretations of its behaviour do indeed 'lose contact', as I argue above, with its organically inherited self-sense-action. But if by 'computation' we mean the fundamental emergence of phenomena by AR+COMP, then in such a scheme we retain the ability to track self-sense-action through layers of emergence. We can also differentiate those narratives which 'exist' metaphorically as mental models and hence could never account for real states of existence-consciousness. C++ classes or zombies both being cases in point. > After Godel, Lob, .... I do think that comp is the best we can hope to > "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia, > (first)-persons, and many notions like that. Tthe "only" price: the > notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to > explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come > back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ... Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis? My scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the characteristics of self-assertion, self-sensing, and self-action. I posit these because they are what is (Occamishly) required to save the appearances. If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting, with its intrinsic (arithmetical) set of symmetry-breaking axioms, then COMP perhaps can stand for the process that drives this potential towards emergent layers of self-action and self-sensing. It then becomes an empirical programme whether AR+COMP possesses the synthetic power to save all the necessary phenomena. As you would wish it, I imagine. Yours in consciousness David > Le 10-juin-07, à 01:49, David Nyman a écrit : > > > > > > > On Jun 9, 2:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit : > > >> I don't believe that people in this list would take consciousness as a > >> primary reality, except perhaps those who singles out the third > >> "universal soul" hypostasis (the first person, alias the one described > >> by Bp & p in the lobian interview) like George Levy, David, etc. > > > Since my name has popped up I'll stop lurking and come clean! I've > > been thinking about this again since reading Galen Strawson's recent > > defence of 'panpsychism' in "Consciousness and its place in Nature". > > His view is that any 'emergent' phenomenon must supervene on > > fundamental properties of the same type - e.g. 'liquidity' is a > > characteristic behaviour of a fluid that simply supervenes on the > > objective characteristics of its constituent molecules, which in turn > > supervenes on quantum-level phenomena and so on down to superstrings > > or whatever. But there is no analogous narrative in which it is > > correspondingly obvious that 1st-person *experience* should ever > > 'emerge' from any objective or 3rd-person description, in his view. > > > Also in mine. Reviewing some of my earlier posts on this subject, I > > would now say that my view is that our 1st-person experience is > > privileged direct evidence (i.e. the *only* direct evidence we have) > > that we, and all phenomena of which we are aware, emerge through > > differentiation of a subjective existential field. Such > > differentiation may be termed 'sense-action', because it is > > simultaneously the self-sensing relationships of (what Strawson terms) > > 'ultimates' (e.g. vibrational strings) that emerge through > > differentiation, and the source of all action and structure. We > > abstract our notion of 'physical law' from the inter-relations of such > > ultimates, but it is crucial that we do not concretise such 'law' as > > some real superadded influence introjected from 'outside' the > > existential field. Rather, we take the field for what it is, and > > accept that it feels and does as we find it. This is simply wielding > > Occam's razor with precision to prevent an infinite regress of > > 'explanation'. Ultimately, to preserve the appearances, existence must > > necessarily be self-actualising , self-motivating, and self-sensing. > > > By rooting sense-action in the ultimates, we can now embed our own > > intuitive sensing and motivation firmly where it needs to be in > > ultimate reality. Fundamentally, we do what we do for (something > > like) the reasons we believe, and we feel what we feel because that is > > (something like) how reality ultimately feels about it. Our actions > > emerge from ultimate action, and our sensing emerges from ultimate > > sensing. This is crucial for questions of 'free will' and suffering > > (which I do not put in scare quotes). Our 'will' is a complex > > emergent of ultimate will-to-action, and our painful experiences are > > directly inherited from underlying layers of sense-action that > > simultaneously motivate our consequential actions. > > > By contrast, the 'non-conscious' zombie is existentially and causally > > disconnected - as postulated, it is abstracted from sense-action; it > > cannot see, hear, or feel and hence cannot enact (except in *our* > > imagination). No self-sensing = no relationship = no action. The > > poor creature is a free-standing 'physical abstraction' - the > > uninhabited husk of a self-actualised subject. It's the notion you're > > left with when you posit an 'externalised world' (i.e. a model) in > > pure intellectual abstraction from concrete self-actualisation. > > Up to here comp basically agree (modulo misunderstanding of my part, > sure). > I mean that what you say is not just consistent with comp (which is not > a lot after Godel: even inconsistency is consistent with comp!) but > probably near truth. > > > > >> With comp neither matter nor mind can be taken as primitive or primary > >> reality. > > > My approach proposes something like a fundamental subjective field as > > 'primitive' (in an Occamish way). Such a field is not yet mind nor > > matter, but both 'mind' and 'matter' emerge from it through > > differentiation, with characteristics that supervene naturally on > > those proposed as primitive. That is: its fundamental action is self- > > motivated and self-sensing, and consequently all complex emergents are > > experienced as self-motivated and self-sensing. > > Well, perhaps OK, unless by field you assume geometry at the start. > (Geometry like physics is secondary with comp). > You could perhaps elaborate of what you mean by field. > > > If valid, this > > approach is a knock-down argument against the equation of > > consciousness with computation. > > Careful: comp cannot equate consciousness and computation. It can only > "equate" consciousness with higher order emergent modality (emergent on > a continuum of computations). > > > The reason is that computational > > 'causation' depends on the introjection of 'rules' from a context > > external to the computed 'world', > > I don't see why. > > > and hence loses contact both with > > intrinsic causal self-motivation and the fundamental linkage of felt- > > sense and action. > > You are quick here ... > > > Hence any felt-sense a computer may possess as a > > concrete object must necessarily be independent of whatever purely > > programmed 'actions' it may be instantiating. > > I do agree here. It fits comp ... > > > Also, the notion of, > > say, a rock implementing any computation, and hence potentially any > > attached consciousness, is likewise struck down by the lack of > > coordination between ultimate sense-action and the notional > > computational content. > > I agree, but this remains to be verified with comp. Indeed it is part > of what makes comp testable empirically. > > > > > I've written the above fairly quickly and it's probably not very well > > expressed, but if anyone's interested I'd be happy to debate and > > enlarge. But it expresses why I think Torgny's position is absolutely > > untenable. > > We do agree on that (although with comp Torgny's position is, like > first person solipsism, quasi undecidable). > > > If he were 'unconscious' as he claims he would be a > > zombie, and hence, abstracted from the reality of sense-action, he > > would exist only in our imaginations. > > I see your point and tend to agree. BTW, note that the Bohm > intepretation of QM is full of zombie of that kind. Without comp, > sorry, but I would much less agree with you on this point. > > After Godel, Lob, .... I do think that comp is the best we can hope to > "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia, > (first)-persons, and many notions like that. Tthe "only" price: the > notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to > explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come > back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ... > > But I realize that few people really swallow Godel, Lob ... and > mathematical logic (except mathematical logicians). I guess that is > perhaps the real difficulty here. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---