Le 11-juin-07, à 08:05, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> > On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> ... >> After Godel, Lob, .... I do think that comp is the best we can hope to >> "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia, >> (first)-persons, and many notions like that. Tthe "only" price: the >> notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to >> explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come >> back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ... >> > > How is assuming comp any better than believing in the personal God? Because in general it is hard to make third person testable statements on personal God. Also, with comp, machines HAVE TO be "theological machine". That is, comp does not prevent some "mystical" (true but unprovable) beliefs: on the contrary, comp makes them obligatory (at least for the ideally correct machines). With comp we can argue that consciousness is already such a mystical state. It is a state such that you have "visions" making you belief in "a reality". Even cats can believe in invisible mouse, when hunting! The closer thing to consciousness for the lobian machine is the "state of being consistent". With machine talking first order arithmetics, "to be consistent" can be identified (actually by 1930 Godel Completeness theorem) with "having a unameable reality" capable of satisfying your set of beliefs. and "to be consistent" belongs to machines' corona [G* minus G]. Indeed, by Godel second theorem, the machine statement "to be consistent" is true (as we can know for simple machine) but unprovable by the machine. After Godel we know that machine can understand/infer that any of their beliefs in a reality has to be theological, even the belief in a physical reality, or whatever. Few people seems to realize the immensity of impact of Godel's discovery (to begin by Godel himself as compared to Emil Post or Alan Turing, ...). Before Godel, after the work of Cantor, mathematicians were hoping to secure the many use of infinities in math by the finistic use of their names in finistic theories. After Godel, we know that we cannot secure the finistic realm itself and that we have to invoke higher infinities just to talk on those finite things. Before Godel we could have believe that the infinite can be secure by the finite. After Godel we know we have to rely on the infinites just to get a tiny scratch idea of what the finite things are capable of. This has given rise to the branch of logic known as "model theory", for example, where infinite objects are used to give clues on finite theories. Note that I am not equating consciousness and consistency. But I am open to the idea that consciousness is related to unconscious (automatic, preprogrommed) self-interrogation of self-consistency. This makes possible to interpret Helmholtz theory of perception (as unconscious bet) in the lobian self-referential discourses. Because we got that "mystical state" at birth since most probably billions years, we tend to be a little blase about it, and this explains why we have to do some work to abstract from long-time prejudices, but then that is what science is all about (as Plato and Descartes have seen). (For the "modalist", consciousness is not "Dt", but "Dt?". The interrogation mark remind that Dt belongs to G* minus G.) I have to go by now and I will try to explain soon why such an inference of "Dt?" gives some advantage relatively to some very general relative survival goal (mainly it gives a relative speed-up) ... > Comp seems like a lot of work. Yes indeed. Two times more work than materialist are used to think. We have to isolate a "theory of mind" AND then, it remains to test the physical laws forced by that theory of mind, as the UDA and the arithmetical UDA justifies (or should justify). But the scientific attitude always asks for "lot of works",as I just said above. C'mon Tom, we are not in a Holiday club here, are we? :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
