On 19/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > This all makes sense if you are referring to the values of a
> > particular entity. Objectively, the entity has certain values and we
> > can use empirical means to determine what these values are. However,
> > if I like red and you like blue, how do we decide which colour is
> > objectively better?
> No, that's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to 'Abstract
> Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete
> information would agree with.
> "What they have to be are inert EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES, taking the
> form: 'Beauty has abstract properties A B C D E F G'. 'Liberty has
> abstract properties A B C D E F G' etc etc. None the less, as
> explained, these abstract specifications would still be amenable to
> indirect empirical testing to the extent that they could be used to
> predict agent emotional reactions to social events."
But I don't see how "all observers with complete information", even if
we further stipulate that they are perfectly rational, could agree on
what we commonly call "values". They would agree on matters of fact,
including such facts as what a particular entity or group of entities
considers beautiful, but whether they agree on what is beautiful is
contingent on whether they happen to have the same taste. Broad
consensus might be reached on certain values if we look at a single
group such as humans, but that all goes out the window when the field
is broadened to include every possible intelligent entity.
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