On Aug 20, 10:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> > No, that's not what I'm referring to.  I'm referring to 'Abstract
> > Universals' - Platonic Ideals that all observers with complete
> > information would agree with.
>
> Even in the restricted arithmetical Platonia, no "observer" can have
> complete information. But they good agree on many subsets  of
> propositions.

Agreed.  I should have said 'all observers with *sufficient*
information'.


>
> > 'redness' is not a *thing* it's a *process* - as a phenomenal
> > (subjective) quality it's a *mathematical* property associated with
> > the running of an algorithm (or computation) .  But this is NOT a
> > *physical* property.  The mathematical property (redness) is *attached
> > to* (resides in, is dependent upon) the physical substrate
> > implementing the algorithm giving rise to the subjective experience ,
> > but the mathematical property *per se* is not physical.  It's
> > abstract.  It's really quite obvious in retrospect - physical
> > properties involve energy, mathematical properties involve knowledge
> > (meaningful patterns).  Old David Chalmers was right about this one
> > (see his 'property dualism').  The two properties just ain't the same
> > and no amount of semantic trickery is going to reduce one to the
> > other.
>
> Math is not physics. But a lot of people argues (incorrectly imo) that
> you can reduce math to physics. And I do agree that the concept of
> quantum information can be used to defend that idea (again, not
> convincingly imo).

But I agree with you here.  I don't think math can be reduced to
physics.  I thought I was clear about this.  I made it clear I thought
mathematical properties are not the same as physical properties.
Physical properties are about energy transfers, mathematical
properties are about knowledge (meaningful patterns).


> Actually I made a point (UDA) that if the brain (or whatever is
> necessary for consciousness to manifest itself) is a digitalizable
> entity, then it is just impossible that physics is not
> derivable---ontically and epistemologically---from number/computer
> science.

Hmm.  I doubt physics is 'derivable' from numer/computer theory
(becuase of the property dualism I am advocating).  But I don't think
math is derivable from physics either.  I need to study this UDA
argument (which I'll get to in due course).

> Of course by admitting dualism, you already abandon comp. (I do
> nevertheless agree with some point you make here and there).
> Actually intersubjective agreement is similar to the first person
> plural notion of comp, and should comprise experimental physics, world
> sharing, etc. But it is just a form of objectivity, at some level.

  It's true I've recently settled on property dualism.  But could you
please explain exactly what you mean by *comp* so I can determine if
there's a conflict?


>
> But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the possibility
> of comp. OK?

My 'property dualism' is quite the same as Chalmer's version.
Chalmers apparently makes phenomal properties primatives.  I don't do
that.  My 'primatives' are *Physical properties*, *Teleological
Properties* and *Mathematical Properties*.  I would then identity
phenomal properties with mathematical properties.  I think phenomenal
properties are just a word we use to describe what are really
mathematical properties.

Again, please explain exactly what you eman by *comp*.


>
> I share nevertheless your platonism on some value (truth, justice,
> freedom,  even beauty on which Plato, Plotinus and the greeks, and
> indians, have succeeded in changing my mind.
> I'm not sure I understand your notion of explanation, from previews
> posts. Physics, does not really explain, it does some genuine and quite
> wonderful compression of the data, but it presupposes somehow the
> mystery (existence, consistence, consciousness) by abstracting from the
> observer. Such an abstraction has been a brilliant and quite useful
> methodological simplifying idea, but it is just an error to abandon the
> search of a global picture of the "world" in which qualitative
> apprehension, by humans or machines,  are taken seriously.

Again, I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to
physics.

>
> Also, you take as axiom that reality is explainable, but taking into
> account we belongs to that reality, rises the fact that some feature of
> reality are not explainable by us. Despite we can bet on some negative
> (limitative) meta-explanation.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -

I'm not sure where we disagree here.  By 'explainable' I don't mean
'fully explainable' (since of course there are things like
uncomputables which aren't comprehensible), I just meant that I think
there do exist meta-explanations of reality (in the form of eternal
conceptual schemes) at high enough levels of abstraction.


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