On Aug 22, 10:14 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Comp is a short expression made for "computationalism".
> Computationalism, which I called also "digital mechanism" is Descartes
> related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often
> precise by defining comp to be the conjunction of Church Thesis and
> "yes doctor". The "yes doctor" assumption is the bet that there is a
> level of description of yourself such that you would survive from some
> digital reconstruction of your body (the 3-person "you") made at that
> From this I don't think it is entirely obvious that materialism (evn
> weak materialism, i.e. physicalism) fails. Actually it is the main
> point that I try to convey, and it is the object of the Universal
> Dovetailer Argument (UDA).
> We don't have to postulate physical laws, if comp is true they have to
> emerge on even a tiny fragment of arithmetical truth. The UDA is not
> constructive (so, after UDA, it still could be that the shorter
> derivation of the physical laws from number is intrinsically not
> feasible). But then I show how computer science and mathematical paves
> the way of an actual short (but complex) derivation of at least the
> necessity of a quantum computer as an invariant of all universal
> machine neighborhood: this should provide a path from bit to qubits.
> The quantum uncertainty emerges from the fact that once a machine look
> at herself below her substitution level, she has to find trace of the
> entire set of computations going through its actual relative comp
> > Under my
> > version, remember, the primatives are Physical,
> But I don't follow you here. Even without comp I don't take the
> "physical" for granted. Science (including theology) appeared when
> human took some distance with "naive realism", despite billions of year
> of evolution which programmed us to take seriously our local
> neighborhood. But you can understand intellectually that the existence
> of primary matter asks for an act of faith.
I don't see that the existence of the material world is any more or
less an act of faith than the existence of the mathematical world. So
these same remarks could be applied to *comp*.
>Nobody has ever prove that
> that exists, and the very old dream-metaphysical argument put a
> reasonable doubt that such a proof can vere been presented. Now, with
> comp, I pretend that matter is devoid of any explanation power. Even if
> you postulate the existence of matter, you will not been able to use it
> to justify any belief, be them on mind or even matter. But I let you
> study the UDA which is supposed to explain that.
I think we need to draw a careful distinction between the *process* of
reasoning itself, and the external entities that reasoning is *about*
*(ie what it is that our theories are externally referencing). When
you carefully examine what mathematics is all about, it seems that it
is all about *knowledge* (justified belief). This is because math
appears to be the study of patterns and when meaning is ascribed to be
these patterns, the result is knowledge. So:
so Math <----> Meaningful Patterns <--------> Knowledge.
Since math appears to be equivalent to knowledge itself, it is no
surprise that all explanations with real explanatory power must use
(or indirectly reference) mathematics. That is to say, I think it's
true that the *process* of reasoning redcues to pure mathematics.
However, it does not follow that all the entities being *referenced*
(refered to) by mathematical theories, are themselves mathematical.
It appears to me that to attempt to reduce everything to pure math
runs the risk of a lapse into pure Idealism, the idea that reality is
'mind created'. Since math is all about knowledge, a successful
attempt to derive physics from math would appear to mean that there's
nothing external to 'mind' itself. As I said, there seems to be a
slippery slipe into solipsism/idealism here. That's why I'm highly
skeptical of your UDA.
I think both yourself (Bruno) and (and you Max Tegmark!) need to
carefully think through consider the implications of your postulate
that all is math. If the implications seem to be pointing to
something unscientific (ie Idealism/Solipsism) then this might
indicate a serious problem with your postulates ;)
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