Le 21-août-07, à 07:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote


> I thought I made it clear I wasn't trying reduce everything to
> physics.

Yes. Nice. I did see that. I did just take the opportunity to criticize 
both those who believe math IS reducible to physics and those (like you 
up to now) who thinks that physics is NOT reducible to math To be 
precise, I do think physics is reducible, not exactly in math, but in 
machine theology (say); once we assume the comp hyp (see below)..





> Hmm.  I doubt physics is 'derivable' from numer/computer theory
> (becuase of the property dualism I am advocating).  But I don't think
> math is derivable from physics either.  I need to study this UDA
> argument (which I'll get to in due course).


Fair enough.


>
>> Of course by admitting dualism, you already abandon comp. (I do
>> nevertheless agree with some point you make here and there).
>> Actually intersubjective agreement is similar to the first person
>> plural notion of comp, and should comprise experimental physics, world
>> sharing, etc. But it is just a form of objectivity, at some level.
>
>   It's true I've recently settled on property dualism.  But could you
> please explain exactly what you mean by *comp* so I can determine if
> there's a conflict?


Comp is a short expression made for "computationalism". 
Computationalism, which I called also "digital mechanism" is Descartes 
related doctrine that we are digitalisable machine. I make it often 
precise by defining comp to be the conjunction of Church Thesis and 
"yes doctor". The "yes doctor" assumption is the bet that there is a 
level of description of yourself such that you would survive from some 
digital reconstruction of your body (the 3-person "you") made at that 
level.
 From this I don't think it is entirely obvious that materialism (evn 
weak materialism, i.e. physicalism) fails. Actually it is the main 
point that I try to convey, and it is the object of the Universal 
Dovetailer Argument (UDA).
We don't have to postulate physical laws, if comp is true they have to 
emerge on even a tiny fragment of arithmetical truth. The UDA is not 
constructive (so, after UDA,  it still  could be that the shorter 
derivation of the physical laws from number is intrinsically not 
feasible). But then I show how computer science and mathematical paves 
the way of an actual short (but complex) derivation of at least the 
necessity of a quantum computer as an invariant of all universal 
machine neighborhood: this should provide a path from bit to qubits. 
The quantum uncertainty emerges from the fact that once a machine look 
at herself below her substitution level, she has to find trace of the 
entire set of computations going through its actual relative comp 
state.




> I'm not sure where we disagree here.  By 'explainable' I don't mean
> 'fully explainable' (since of course there are things like
> uncomputables which aren't comprehensible), I just meant that I think
> there do exist meta-explanations of reality (in the form of eternal
> conceptual schemes) at high enough levels of abstraction.


I do agree with this.




>>
>> But apparently, like Chalmers, you seem to dismiss even the 
>> possibility
>> of comp. OK?
>>
>
> Sorry, I meant to say in previous post that my version property is NOT
> quite the same as Chalmer's version.

Nice. I find Chalmers incoherent, both on mind and matter.



> Again, Chalmer's apparently
> makes phenomenal properties primatives, but I do not.


OK. I follow you here.



> Under my
> version, remember, the primatives are Physical,

But I don't follow you here. Even without comp I don't take the 
"physical" for granted. Science (including theology) appeared when 
human took some distance with "naive realism", despite billions of year 
of evolution which programmed us to take seriously our local 
neighborhood. But you can understand intellectually that the existence 
of primary matter asks for an act of faith. Nobody has ever prove that 
that exists, and the very old dream-metaphysical argument put a 
reasonable doubt that such a proof can vere been presented. Now, with 
comp, I pretend that matter is devoid of any explanation power. Even if 
you postulate the existence of matter, you will not been able to use it 
to justify any belief, be them on mind or even matter. But I let you 
study the UDA which is supposed to explain that.



> Teleological

I don't understand how a teleological thing can be primitive.


>  and
> Mathematical entities.  'phenomenal' properties are just a word we use
> to describe what are really mathematical properties.  My version need
> not conflict with *comp*.

It conflicts with the reversal matter/mind which follows when you take 
comp sufficiently seriously.

You know Marc, I tend to agree with Russell Standish here. Property 
dualism can be seen as a form of emergentism. The "property":
'Glass Half Fill'
'Glas Half Empty'
can be said to emerge from the computation locally supported in some 
observer mind (person)  through the observation of the glass.
In that sense, comp comes up with a property trialism, (the three main 
plotinian hypostases/person-pov) or octo-ism (the full 8 hypostases).
But the ontic background of this form of emergentism are the numbers, 
not physical primitives.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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