Colin Hales wrote: > Hello again Jesse, > I am going to assume that by trashing computationalism that Marc Geddes > has enough ammo to vitiate Eleizer's various predilections.... so... to > that end... > > Your various comments (see below) have a common thread of the form "I > see no reason why you can't ..X.". So let's focus on reasons why you > can't ...X. These are numerous and visible in real - empirically > verifiable physics...let's look at it from a dynamics point of view. In > saying 'you can see no reason....' would mean that if you chose a > computationalist abstraction level (you mentioned atoms) that you would > claim the resultant agent able to demonstrate scientific behaviour > indistinguishable from a human. > > I would claim that to be categorically false and testably so. OK. > Firstly call the computationalist artificial scientist, COMP_S. Call the > human scientist HUMAN_S. Call computationalism COMP. This saves a lot of > writing! The test regime: > > HUMAN_S constructs laws of nature tn using the human faculty for > observation (call it P) delivered by real atoms in the brain of HUMAN_S. > If COMP_S and HUMAN_S are to be indistinguishable then the state > dynamics (state vector space) of COMP_S must be as sophisticated, > accessible as HUMAN_S and ALSO /convergent on the same outcomes as those > of HUMAN_S/. Our test is that they both converge on a law of nature tn, > say. Note: tn is a abstracted statement of an underlying generalisation > in respect of the distal external natural world (such as tn = ta, a > model of an atom). Yes? That is what we do... the portability of laws of > nature tn proves that we have rendered such abstractions invariant to > the belief dynamics of any particular scientist.. Yes? > > HUMAN_S constructs a model of atoms a 'law of nature' = ta. Using that > model ta we then implement a sophisticated computational version of > HUMAN_S at the level of the model: atoms. We assemble an atomic-level > model replica of HUMAN_S. We run the computation on a host COMP > substrate. This becomes our COMP_S. We expect the two to be identical to > the extent of delivering indistinguishable scientific behaviour. We > embody COMP_S with IO as sophisticated as a human and wire it up....If > the computationalist position holds, by definition, the dynamics of > COMP_S must be (a) complex enough and (b) have access to sufficient > disambiguated information to construct tn indistinguishably from HUMAN_S. > > If computationalism is true then given the same circumstance of original > knowledge paucity (which can be tested), A demand for a scientific > outcome should result in state-vector dynamics adaptation resulting in > the delivery of the same tn (also testable), which we demand shall be > radically novel.... If they are really equivalent this should happen. > This is the basic position (I don't want to write it out again!) > ================================================ > > I would claim the state trajectory of COMP_S to be fatally impoverished > by the model ta. (abstracted atoms). That is, the state-trajectory of > COMP_S would fail to consistently converge on a new law of nature tn and > would demonstrate instability (chaotic behaviour). Just like ungrounded > power supplly voltage drift about, a symbolically ungrounded COMP_S > will epistemically drift about. > > Indeed I would hold that would be the case no matter what the > abstraction level: sub-atomic, sub-sub atomic , sub sub sub atomic > ...... etc ... the result would be identical. Remember: there's no such > 'thing' as atoms...these are an abstraction - of a particular level of > the organisational hierarchy of nature. .... also note ... so-called' > ab-initio quantum mechanics of the entire HUMAN_S would also fail > because QM is likewise just an abstraction of reality, not reality. COMP > would claim that the laws of nature describing atoms behave identically > to atoms. The model ensemble of ta atoms should be capable of expressing > all the emergent properties of an ensemble of real atoms. This already > makes COMP a self-referential question-begging outcome. HUMAN_S is our > observer, made of real atoms. COMP assumes that P is delivered by > computing ta when there is no such 'thing' as atoms! Atoms are an > abstraction of a thing, not a thing. Furthermore, all the orighinal > atoms of HUMAN_S have been replaced with the atoms of the COMP_S substrate. > > What is NOT in law of nature ta is the relationship between the > abstraction ta and all the other atoms in the distal world outside > COMP_S. (beyond the IO boundary). Assume you supplied all the data about > all the atoms in the environment of the original human HUMAN_S used to > construct and initialise COMP_S. You know all these relationships at the > moment you measured all the atoms in HUMAN_S to get you model > established. However, after initialisation, when you run the COMP_S, all > relationships of the model with the distal world (those intrinsic to the > atoms which the model replaced) are GONE ....
I can't tell from your exposition whether you are assuming that the external world is modelled along with the comp-s or whether the comp-s is provided with sensory mechanisms so as to interact with the world. >the instant the > abstraction happens, from that moment on you know NOTHING about the > current state of the distal environment...all you have is IO > measurements. And that's all a human scientist has too - IO measurements by his senses. >You cannot claim that the model includes all those > relationships because you are doing SCIENCE and you cannot a-priori know > these.... > > That is, the very thing you mention below - interaction between > component parts - cannot be claimed to be 100% complete because all the > relationships with the distal natural world are GONE - the relationship > of the original atoms with space and everything else has been replaced > by a model inside a totally different substrate where the relationships > are abstracted and cannot even be guessed. They are GONE. You can't > replace them because you are doing science and you don't know where the > items are, nor do you know their nature - for you are doing science to > find that out! The IO is fundamentally degenerately related to the > distal world and there is no supervision. > > RE: No free lunch theorem (NFL) > The scenario around which NFL is constructed is functionally > indistinguishable to COMP. Your "machine learning" mission is to choose > functions to match measurements, not match laws of nature to > observations. The former happens at the periphery (in data). The latter > happens in the phenomenal consciousness of an appropriately endowed > scientist who has a view of the origination of the measurements and can > then contextualise them into a law of nature. There is no a-priori way > of distinguishing a 'law of nature' describing the origination of > measurements from the measurements themselves. It is impossible to > construct such a thing from the peripheral measurements alone....QM > degeneracy prohibits that. A function that predicts the behaviour of > data is *not a law of nature*. The data in COMP_S arrives, just as it > arrives in the NFL scenario... without context - no amount of IO cross > correlation restores access to the distal real world- remember the > artificial scientist is demanded to be fundamentally unsupervised > 'learning' of tn. > > *Game over!* Don't think so. I think all your argument shows is that some form of embodiment is needed for intelligence. But that doesn't show that computationalism is false, only that it's impractical - one has to know to much to duplicate human intelligence because it includes duplicating so many relations. This may be true - or it may not. But it doesn't show COMP-S is impossible in logical or nomological sense. Brent > ====================================== > Note that thios does not mean I hold that an "artificial scientist" is > impossible. Far from it: it is my mission in life (artificial general > intelligence). I hold that it will not happen with ABSTRACT computation. > I aim to build chips with all the REAL molecular electrodynamics in them > where everything important to cognition is conserved... It's what my > science is about. I am not building a COMP_S. I am building an > INORGANIC_S with all the physics in it. Such a creature does NOT do > abstract computation (manipulate abstract symbols) Yes there are > manipulation of the abstraction called the 'action potential'... but > this is < 50% of reality. > > So once again I reiterate: COMP is FALSE, but not in the way you think. > It's false as a general claim because it can't simulate a scientist in > the act of doing an original scientific act on the a-priori unknown. > Indeed the use of the word 'simulate' is an oxymoron. You can't simulate > an original scientific act. If an artefact does the science then there > is no simulating going on - the act is REAL SCIENCE. Conversely if you > get an artefact to simulate a scientific act then it cannot be original > (you must have all the knowledge a-priori) ... and therefore, when faced > with radical novelty the same agent will fail because ultimately it > relied on human supervision - humans defined what novelty looks like. > > This position is not a trivial/simplistic position. It clarifies a great > deal in an unexpected way. Throughout this whole discourse it has been > the assumption that you can 'simulate' everything. This is almost > true.... 99.9999999% true... except for this one special > circumstance.... simulating an original scientific act... where > simulation is merely meaningless/useless, not wrong! > > A final nuance. > > In claiming COMP to be false now I make the claim based merely on the > balance of probabilities - after proper critical argument in respect of > design choices. Maybe one day when we've built INORGANIC_S with the > full electrodynamics of real brain material and acquired more knowledge > of the possible roles of abstract computation in such an entity - maybe > then we'll be in a better position to entertain 100% COMP_S. I doubt it > but I'm willing to entertain the possibiltiy d from a vantage point of > HINDSIGHT, not assumption.....What I claim is that right now the COMP > assumption is a critically inferior choice for very practical, > empirically testable reasons. As such COMP is to be eschewed as an AGI > design choice. yes COMP can be used to model brain behaviour and the > science will be useful... but "COGNITION is COMP" is an invalid stance. > It was 50 years ago and it daily grows more erroneous. > > RE: Uploading? IMHO this will be possible with my chips, but impossible > with purely COMP chips. It will depend on the existence of imaging > systems with sub-molecular-level spatial resolution and on a > time-resolution of the order of nano-seconds worst case.. In the interim > it may be better to replace your brain with my chips...slowly...and then > the rest of the hardware - slowly... you'd end up 100% inorganic, but > you would NOT be a COMP entity. This is more doable in the shorter term. > > So I can think of multiple reasons 'why you can't...X'......Thanks for > forcing me to verbalise the argument...in yet another way... > > regards, > > Colin Hales > > > ====================================================== > Jesse Mazer wrote: >> Colin Hales wrote: >> >> >>> Hi! >>> Assumptions assumption assumptions....take a look: You said: >>> >>> "Why would you say that? Computer simulations can certainly produce results >>> you didn't already know about, just look at genetic algorithms." >>> >>> OK. here's the rub... "You didn't already know about...". >>> Just exactly 'who' (the 'you') is 'knowing' in this statement? >>> You automatically put an external observer outside my statement. >>> >> >> Of course, I was talking about the humans running the program, which I >> assumed is what you meant by "you" in the statement "If you could compute a >> scientist you would already know everything!" If there is no fundamental >> barrier to simple computer programs like genetic algorithms coming up with >> results we didn't expect or know about in advance, I see no fundamental >> reason why you couldn't have vastly more complex computer programs >> simulating entire human brains, and these programs would act just like >> regular biological brains, coming up with ideas that neither external >> observers watching them nor they themselves (assuming they are conscious >> just like us) knew about in advance. >> >> >>> My observer is the knower. There is no other knower: The scientist who gets >>> to know is the person I am talking about! There's nobody else around who >>> gets to decide what is known... you put that into my story where there is >>> none. >>> >> >> Like I said, when you wrote "If you could compute a scientist you would >> already know everything", I assumed the "you" referred to a person watching >> the program run, not to the program itself. But if you want to eliminate >> this and just have one conscious being, I see no reason why the program >> itself couldn't be conscious, and couldn't creatively invent knew ideas it >> didn't know before they occurred to it, just like a biological human >> scientist can do. >> >> >>> A genetic algorithm (that is, a specific kind of computationalist >>> manipulation of abstract symbols) cannot be a scientist. Even the 'no free >>> lunch' theorem, proves that without me adding anything.... >>> >> >> No it doesn't. The free lunch program only applies when you sum over all >> possible fitness landscapes, most of which would look completely random >> (i.e. nearby points on the landscape are no more likely to have nearby >> fitness values than are distant points--see the diagram of a random fitness >> landscape in section 5.3 of the article at >> http://www.talkreason.org/articles/choc_nfl.cfm#nflt ), whereas if you're >> dealing with the subclass of relatively smooth fitness landscapes that >> describe virtually all the sorts of problems we're interested in (where >> being close to an optimal solution is likely to be better than being far >> from it), then genetic algorithms can certainly do a lot better than most >> other types of algorithms. >> >> Anyway, I didn't say that a genetic algorithm can "be a scientist", just >> that if "you" are a human observer watching it run, it can come up with >> things that you didn't already know. I think a very detailed simulation of a >> human brain at the synaptic level, of the kind that is meant when people >> discuss "mind uploading" (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) >> should in principle be capable of displaying all the same abilities as the >> biological brain it's a simulation of, including scientific abilities. >> Anyone who believes in scientific reductionism--that the behavior of complex >> systems is ultimately due to the sum of interactions of all its parts, which >> interact in lawlike ways--should grant that this sort of thing must be >> possible *in principle*, whether or not we are ever actually able to achieve >> it as a technical matter. >> >> >>> but just to seal the lid on it....I would defy any computationalist >>> artefact based on abstract symbol manipulation to come up with a "law of >>> nature" ... >>> >> >> I take it you reject the idea that the brain is an "artefact" whose >> large-scale behavior ultimately boils down to the interaction of all its >> constituent atoms, which interact according to laws which can be >> approximated arbitrarily well by a computer simulation? (if space and time >> are really continuous the approximation can never be perfect, but it can be >> arbitrarily close) >> >> > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
