I would agree it is just a process, however I came up with that thought experiment because a friend of mine expressed fear over the idea of stepping into a teleporter. He was weary that his consciousness would be destroyed and the other copy created elsewhere would "not be me".
I began with telling him it doesn't matter so long as a copy of him existed somewhere that thought it was him, which is a lot like your "it's a process" argument, but he was not satisfied. I think my argument helps show that even if it is a process that subjectively, conciousness continues even if in some place or time it is stopped. Therefore he ought not fear a star trek style transporter. Jason On Nov 1, 2008, at 4:49 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > If you stop thinking of consciousness as a "thing" that goes here or > there or is duplicated or destroyed and just regard it as a process, > these conundrums disappear. > > Brent > > Jason Resch wrote: >> I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA >> argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both >> locations simultaneously. >> >> Since the UDA accepts digital mechanism as its first premise, then it >> is possible to instantiate a consciousness within a computer. >> Therefore instead of a physical teleportation from Brussels to >> Washington and Moscow instead we will have a digital transfer. This >> will allow the experimenter to have complete control over the input >> each mind receives and guarantee identical content of experience. >> >> A volunteer in Brussels has her brain frozen and scanned at the >> necessary substitution level and the results are loaded into a >> computer with the appropriate simulation software that can accurately >> model her brain's functions, therefore from her perspective, her >> consciousness continues onward from the time her brain was frozen. >> >> To implement the teleportation, the simulation in the computer in >> Brussels is paused, and a snapshot of the current state is sent over >> the Internet to two computers, one in Washington and the other in >> Moscow, each of these computers has the same simulation software and >> upon receipt, resume the simulation of the brain where it left off in >> Brussels. >> >> The question is: if the sensory input is pre-fabricated and identical >> in both computers, are there two minds, or simply two implementations >> of the same mind? If you believe there are two minds, consider the >> following additional steps. >> >> Since it was established that the experimenter can "teleport" minds >> by >> pausing a simulation, sending their content over the network, and >> resuming it elsewhere, then what happens if the experimenter wants to >> teleport the Washington mind to Moscow, and the Moscow mind to >> Washington? Assume that both computers were preset to run the >> simulation for X number of CPU instructions before pausing the >> simulation and transferring the state, such that the states are >> exactly the same when each is sent. Further assume that the >> harddrive >> space on the computers is limited, so as they receive the brain >> state, >> they overwrite their original save. >> >> During this procedure, the computers in Washington and Moscow each >> receive the other's brain state, however, it is exactly the same as >> the one they already had. Therefore the overwriting is a no-op. >> After the transfer is complete, each computer resumes the simulation. >> Now is Moscow's mind on the Washington computer? If so how did a >> no-op (overwriting the file with the same bits) accomplish the >> teleportation, if not, what makes the teleportation fail? >> >> What happens in the case where the Washington and Moscow computer >> shutdown for some period of time (5 minutes for example) and then >> ONLY >> the Moscow computer is turned back on. Did a "virtual" teleportation >> occur between Washington and Moscow to allow the consciousness that >> was in Washington to continue? If not, then would a physical >> transfer >> of the data from Washington to Moscow have saved its consciousness, >> and if so, what happened to the Moscow consciousness? >> >> The above thought experiments led me to conclude that both computers >> implement the same mind and are the same mind, despite >> having different explanations. Turning off one of the computers in >> either Washington or Moscow, therefore, does not end the >> consciousness. Per the conclusions put forth in the UDA, the >> volunteer in Brussels would say she has a 1/2 chance of ending up in >> the Washington computer and 1/2 chance of ending up in the Moscow >> computer. Therefore, if you told her "15 minutes after the >> teleportation the computer in Washington will be shut off forever" >> she >> should expect a 1/2 chance of dying. This seems to be a >> contradiction, as there is a "virtual" teleportation from Washington >> to Moscow which saves the consciousness in Washington from oblivion. >> So her chances of death are 0, not 1/2, which is only explainable if >> we assume that her mind is subjectively in both places after the >> first >> teleport from Brussels, and so long as a simulation of her mind >> exists >> somewhere she will never die. >> >> Jason >> >> >> On Fri, Oct 31, 2008 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 30 Oct 2008, at 23:58, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >>> >>> Kory Heath wrote: >>>> >>>> On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will >> answer >>>>> that the probability remains invariant for that too. The >> probability >>>>> remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is >>>>> the perfect one). >>>>> But of course you have to accept that if a simple teleportation is >>>>> done imperfectly (without duplication), but without killing >> you, the >>>>> probability of surviving is one (despite you get blind, deaf, >>>>> amnesic and paralytic, for example). >>>> >>>> This is the position I was arguing against in my earlier post. >> Let's >>>> stick with simple teleportation, without duplication. If the >> data is >>>> scrambled so much that the thing that ends up on the other side is >>>> just a puddle of goo, then my probability of surviving the >>>> teleportation is 0%. It's functionally equivalent to just >> killing me >>>> at the first teleporter and not sending any data over. (Do you >>>> agree?) >>>> If the probability of me surviving when an imperfect copy is >> made is >>>> still 100%, then there's some point of "imperfection" at which my >>>> chances of surviving suddenly shift from 100% to 0%. This >> change will >>>> be marked by (say) the difference of a single molecule (or bit of >>>> data, or whatever). I don't see how that can be correct. >>>> >>>> -- Kory >>> >>> But there are many ways for what comes out of the teleporter to >>> *not* be you. >>> Most of them are "puddles of goo", but some of them are copies of >>> Bruno or >>> imperfect copies of me or people who never existed before. >>> >>> Suppose it's a copy of you as you were last year - is it 100% you. >>> It's not >>> 100% the you that went into the machine - but if you're the same >>> person you were >>> last year it's 100% you. Of course the point is that you're not the >>> same "you" >>> from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information >>> down to the >>> molecular level, or even the neuron level. >> >> >> Yes. And if a teleporter transforms me into a copy of me as I >> was last >> year, I will say that although I have 100% survive, I suffer >> from an >> amnesia bearing on one year of experience, and indeed I will >> have to >> relearn what "I" have done and update myself accordingly. >> >> I can complain about the doctor or about the teleportation >> company of >> course, like someone who did survive a train accident, with >> injuries, >> perhaps amnesia, can complain about the railroad society (if he >> remembers the name). >> >> >> --Bruno Marchal >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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