On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Hi Jason,
> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is
> > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the
> > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new
> > world/reality.
> I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6,
> is that you do survive there  like if it was teleportation. And in that
> context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five
> preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that
> if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that
> copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the
> virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you
> will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is
> 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's
> closer continuer identity theory fails with comp.

My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in
expecting your next observer moment work this way.  From a third person
perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as
you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not
experience all 3 locations at once.  I think this is where I disagree, you
_do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations
and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to
merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations.

This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a
4-dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being
in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from
past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future
states to the present.  The vast majority of information within our brain
state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent
past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our
true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of
birth to death.

This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into
believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing
to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current content
of their experience.  I think it is a mistake to use the memories one has
access to as a means to delineate observers, for the vast majority of ones
memories are not in the content of ones OM at any one time.


 I think the importance of a particular computational history in defining an
"observer moment" is not as important as memory/communication isolation.

The Universal Dovetailer shares a single computational history as one
well-defined short program, and it implements all possible observer moments.
 Yet would not all OM's it generates be considered the same since they share
a single computational history?  I think it is better to track the flow of
information that goes

(Experiencingo ne moment because of no communication from the future tothe
past, and very low bandwidth rate from the past to the present)  Surely if I
was duplicated to 100 locations (only one of which was Moscow), I could
wager $1 that I will not appear in Moscow, and 99 of my copies will be
richer but

One OM that travels across all OM's, the UD?  ...Share computational
history, same program, it is jsut that the information doesn't get linked
between them.

> If you get this, I guess you are ready to understand step 7.
> I would be pleased to know if you get the step 7. If everyone agree
> with step 7, we can proceed to step 8, which is a bit more difficult.
> In my older presentations (like my PhD thesis), I always begin with
> step 8, and I call it "the Movie Graph Argument". The older UDA was
> only 1...7. Only 1...7 shows that comp transform physics into a
> computer science probability calculus. The Movie Graph Argument singles
> out the difficulty to attach mind to matter, or consciousness to
> physical activity, oncer we *assume* the comp hyp. It is the Movie
> Graph Argument which shows that we don't have to run the UD in a
> concrete way.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

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