On 03 Nov 2008, at 18:10, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
> I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why
> it is so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining "I" or "world",
> but I was hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past
> post which explain this. In particular I do not follow how only one
> of "I" or "the world" can be computable, why not both? Does the UDA
> not enumerate all possible worlds and all possible Is?
Well I apologize because I have send the draft (brouillon) of my
answer to Brent by error on the list. I intended to send it to my home
computer so that I can make corrections before. But's ok.
Here I was recalling the definition of "generalized brain": the
portion of the universe that you have to emulate digitally for
surviving in a comp teleportation.
Some people indeed want to make consciousness supervening on the brain
+ some context (the world), and see that as an objection to the uda.
but that is why I put such context in the "generalized brain", and the
argument still go through, unless that generalized brainis supposed to
be not turing emulable.
The thought experiment per se is harder to perform (how to put the
moon in the teleportation box for those who put the moon as part of
their context-brain!), but when the DU is introduced we see that the
"bigness of whatever is taken as a context" is not relevant, as far
as it is computable.
COMP assumes that such a digital relatively relevant descriptive
portion of universe exists (by definition), so if you put the moon or
the entire cosmos in the definition of your brain, we are still under
the comp assumption. Unless, of course, the moon or the context or
world is assumed to be non turing emulable. In that case comp is
false, because you are saying that
-my real generalized brain (by definition the things on which your
consciousness supervenes here and now) is equal to my organic brain in
my skull + my body + the moon + the cat, and then you add
- and my cat is non turing emulable,
then of course comp is false, your generalized brain is not turing
emulable (it works only the non turing emulable cat).
This is simple logic (any difficulty here can only be explained by my
poor english or something like that. Please tell me if you grasp what
I try to say here. It is not particularly deep).
The point of all this is that we can reason *despite* we cannot define
"I" or "the world". Comp is just the bet that the I, the I that I
feel, can be recovered by a third person "I" description, whatever it
is, under the condition of belonging to the computable things locally.
Brent seems to pretend that he is able to distinguish real and virtual
(Note that in a post to Brett Hall, I explain tat we *can* do that in
a relative way, but it takes a long time, and we have to survive
through it before, and also it works only statistically. Indeed
quantum evidence gives, from a comp pov, such an evidence, I mean that
we are in number matrix).
What do you think of step six? Do you think you die, in step six?
I use the generalized brain explicitly for preventing the move, for
objecting the derivation, consciousness supervenes on brain + context.
Brent, what if I send you regularly on mars by teletransportation,
assuming you are a fidel tourist of my Mars-teleportation company. yet
during the year 2007 (but not 2008), due to budget restriction, I fail
you, and send you to virtual mars. And then again on real mars after
in 2008 (better year!).
You think this scenario is impossible in practice? If the comp level
of substitution exist, I can fail you for any finite period of time,
even without intervening directly on your brain memories (I need some
high budget too for this of course).
Sorry if I am unclear, but feel free all to ask for any clarifications,
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