Bruno Marchal wrote: > Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker: > > > On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote: > > > >> I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA >> argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both >> locations simultaneously. >> >> Since the UDA accepts digital mechanism as its first premise, then >> it is possible to instantiate a consciousness within a computer. >> Therefore instead of a physical teleportation from Brussels to >> Washington and Moscow instead we will have a digital transfer. This >> will allow the experimenter to have complete control over the input >> each mind receives and guarantee identical content of experience. >> >> A volunteer in Brussels has her brain frozen and scanned at the >> necessary substitution level and the results are loaded into a >> computer with the appropriate simulation software that can >> accurately model her brain's functions, therefore from her >> perspective, her consciousness continues onward from the time her >> brain was frozen. >> >> To implement the teleportation, the simulation in the computer in >> Brussels is paused, and a snapshot of the current state is sent over >> the Internet to two computers, one in Washington and the other in >> Moscow, each of these computers has the same simulation software and >> upon receipt, resume the simulation of the brain where it left off >> in Brussels. >> >> The question is: if the sensory input is pre-fabricated and >> identical in both computers, are there two minds, or simply two >> implementations of the same mind? If you believe there are two >> minds, consider the following additional steps. >> > > > > Only one mind, belonging to two relative histories (among an infinity). > > > > > >> Since it was established that the experimenter can "teleport" minds >> by pausing a simulation, sending their content over the network, and >> resuming it elsewhere, then what happens if the experimenter wants >> to teleport the Washington mind to Moscow, and the Moscow mind to >> Washington? Assume that both computers were preset to run the >> simulation for X number of CPU instructions before pausing the >> simulation and transferring the state, such that the states are >> exactly the same when each is sent. Further assume that the >> harddrive space on the computers is limited, so as they receive the >> brain state, they overwrite their original save. >> >> During this procedure, the computers in Washington and Moscow each >> receive the other's brain state, however, it is exactly the same as >> the one they already had. Therefore the overwriting is a no-op. >> After the transfer is complete, each computer resumes the >> simulation. Now is Moscow's mind on the Washington computer? If so >> how did a no-op (overwriting the file with the same bits) accomplish >> the teleportation, if not, what makes the teleportation fail? >> >> What happens in the case where the Washington and Moscow computer >> shutdown for some period of time (5 minutes for example) and then >> ONLY the Moscow computer is turned back on. Did a "virtual" >> teleportation occur between Washington and Moscow to allow the >> consciousness that was in Washington to continue? If not, then >> would a physical transfer of the data from Washington to Moscow have >> saved its consciousness, and if so, what happened to the Moscow >> consciousness? >> >> The above thought experiments led me to conclude that both computers >> implement the same mind and are the same mind, despite having >> different explanations. >> > > Rigth. > > > >> Turning off one of the computers in either Washington or Moscow, >> therefore, does not end the consciousness. >> > > > Yes. > > > >> Per the conclusions put forth in the UDA, the volunteer in Brussels >> would say she has a 1/2 chance of ending up in the Washington >> computer and 1/2 chance of ending up in the Moscow computer. >> Therefore, if you told her "15 minutes after the teleportation the >> computer in Washington will be shut off forever" she should expect a >> 1/2 chance of dying. This seems to be a contradiction, as there is >> a "virtual" teleportation from Washington to Moscow which saves the >> consciousness in Washington from oblivion. So her chances of death >> are 0, not 1/2, which is only explainable if we assume that her mind >> is subjectively in both places after the first teleport from >> Brussels, and so long as a simulation of her mind exists somewhere >> she will never die. >> > > > And an infinity of those simulations exists, a-spatially and a- > temporally, in arithmetic, (or in the "standard model of > arithmetic") which entails comp-immortality (need step 8!). Actually > a mind is never really located somewhere. Location is a construct of > the mind. A (relative) body is what makes it possible for a mind to > manifest itself relatively to some history/computation-from-inside. > The movie graph argument (the 8th of UDA) justifies the necessity of > this, but just meditation on the phantom limbs can help. The pain is > not in the limb (given the absence of the limb), and the pain is not > in the brain, (the brain is not sensitive) yet the subject locates the > pain in the limb. Similarly we located ourself in space time, but if > you push the logic of comp to its ultimate conclusion you understand > that, assuming comp, space time is a phantom itself. Plato was on the > right (with respect to comp) track. > > (Math: And computer science makes it possible to derive the > mathematical description of that phantom, making comp Popper > falsifiable. The phantom can be mathematically recovered from > intensional variants of self-referential (Godel) provability modality > G and G*). > > > ========================== > Brent Meeker wrote > > >> My guess is that eventually we'll be able to create AI/robots that >> seem >> as intelligent and conscious as, for example, dogs seem. >> We'll also be >> able to partially map brains so that we can say that when these >> neurons >> do this the person is thinking thus and so. Once we have this degree >> of >> understanding and control, questions about "consciousness" will no >> longer seem relevant. They'll be like the questions that philosophers >> asked about life before we understood the molecular functions of >> living >> systems. They would ask:Where is the life? Is a virus alive? How >> does >> life get passed from parent to child? The questions won't get >> answered; they'll just be seen as the wrong questions. >> > > > > You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. To > solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist > have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap between > computer science and computer's computer science ... > Physics is the fixed point of universal machine self observation. > Let me know at which step (1?, ... 8?) you have a problem? The only > one not discussed thoroughly is the 8th one. > I have reservations about #6: Consciousness is a process, but it depends on a context. In the argument as to whether a stone is a computer, even a universal computer, the error is in ignoring that the computation in a computer has an interpretation which the programmer provides. If he can provide this interpretation to the processes within a stone, then indeed it would be a computer; but in general he can't. I think consciousness is similar; it is a process but it only has an interpretation as a *conscious* process within a context of perception and action within a world. Which is why I think philosophical zombies are impossible. But then, when you imagine reproducing someone's consciousness, in a computer and simulating all the input/output, i.e. all the context, then you have created a separate world in which there is a consciousness in the context of *that* world. But it doesn't follow that it is a consciousness in this world. The identification of things that happen in the computer as "He experiences this." depend on our interpretation of the computer program. There is no inherent, ding-an-sich consciousness.
Your step #6 can be saved by supposing that a robot is constructed so that the duplicated consciousness lives in the context of our world, but this does not support the extension to the UD in step #7. To identify some program the UD is generating as reproducing someone's consciousness requires an interpretation. But an interpretation is a mapping between the program states and the real world states - so it presumes a real world. I have several problems with step #8. What are consistent 1-histories? Can they be characterized without reference to nomological consistency? The reduction to Platonia seems almost like a reduction argument against comp. Except that comp was the assumption that one physical process can be replaced by another that instantiates the same physical relations. I don't see how it follows from that there need not be an instantiation at all and we can just assume that the timeless existence in Platonia is equivalent. You write: "...the appearance of physics must be recovered from some point of views emerging from those propositions." But how does is this "emergence" work? Isn't it like saying if I postulate an absolute whole that includes all logically possible relations then this must include the appearance of physics and all I need is the probability measure that picks it out. It's like Michaelangelo saying, "This block of marble contains a statue of David. All I need is the measure that assigns 0 to the part that's not David and 1 to the part that is David." > To be sure, do you understand the nuance between the following theses: > > WEAK AI: some machines can behave as if their were conscious (but > could as well be zombies) > STRONG AI: some machines can be conscious > COMP: I am a machine > > We have > > COMP => STRONG AI => WEAK AI > > WEAK does not imply STRONG AI which does not imply COMP. (it is not > because machine can be conscious that we are necessarily machine > ourself, of course with occam razor, STRONG AI go in the direction of > COMP). > > Does those nuances make sense? If not (1...8) does not, indeed, make > sense. You just don't believe in consciousness and/or person like in > the eliminative materialism of neuro-philosophers ( the Churchland, > amost Dennett in "consciousness explained"). > I think they make some good arguments. I don't think that consciousness is a thing or can exist apart from a much larger context. Brent > Or you make us very special infinite analogical machines, but then you > drop the digital mechanist thesis (even the naturalist one, which has > been shown inconsistent by 1...8.) > > > Bruno Marchal > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
