On 11 Nov 2008, at 22:44, Jason Resch wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  
> wrote:
> On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  
>> wrote:
>> PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
>> explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am  
>> Turing
>> emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable.
>> Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to  
>> ask) you about several days ago.  But it was phrased differently,  
>> something like "If I am the universe and the universe is not  
>> turning emulable then comp is false"  Here you are saying the  
>> universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies  
>> "I != universe".  I look forward to your explanation of why the  
>> universe is not Turing emulable.  BTW: Does this apply to just the  
>> Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which  
>> are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain?
> Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp  
> UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument,  
> you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all.
> How can you be sure all the computation going through your current  
> state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or  
> 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a  
> universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense,  
> why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it  
> would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already.
> I don't consider myself or any observer glued to any single reality,  
> yet I still believe coherent realities exist.  See below.
> How does the computability of the universe relate to the evacuation  
> of white rabbits?

In the sense that if the white rabbits are computable, then it is hard  
to see why to call them white rabbits at all. In the worst case they  
will be called complex unknown, like the shape of the clouds, or far  
away galaxies ...

> If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that  
> the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those  
> white rabbits, they are there in "arithmetic". We can only hope (if  
> we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there  
> is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare.
> And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the  
> contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the  
> Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the  
> existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful  
> ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you  
> have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of  
> (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then  
> you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers.  
> Including the geometrical and topological background.
> The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM,  
> is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already  
> confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the  
> indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the  
> quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions.
> The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on  the quantum Universal  
> solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch)  
> we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the  
> *quantum white rabbits*. But if we assume mechanism, we can no more  
> postulate the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations,  
> meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1- 
> inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any  
> computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a  
> priori indicates that the result is a computable things.
> I think we are in general agreement regarding the idea that a first  
> person experience belongs to many (perhaps infinite) computational  
> histories.

First person experience belongs to many (necessarily infinite)  
computational histories (from UDA), but OK.

>  I think the confusion may have come down to language, in particular  
> how we defined "universe".  I see now you take "universe" to mean  
> the perceived environment that appears as a first person experience  
> to observers.  I also see how this collection of possible histories  
> can be incomputable/unknowable.  Whereas, I was defining "universe"  
> to mean a single consistent computational/mathematical history which  
> may implement computations that form first person experiences.

Hmmm... Such a "universe" cannot exist, unless you are willing to call  
the Universal Deployment itself a universe. Then OK, and the  
"universe" is a tiny part Arithmetical Truth.
A computation is enough to have a consciousness, once it has the  
relative environment which "survive" the universal dovetailing, but  
the you cannot attach that consciousness to your "universe", but to  
all possible "universe" already in the deployment.
It seems you still believed that you can force consciousness to stay  
in some particular computation, when the UD argument shows that  
consciousness is indetermined on the set of *all* computations.

> These first person view points, by mechanism, would not be unique to  
> any particular history, but belong to all histories which implement  
> the same computations.  Individual histories, as I see it, may or  
> may not be computable, but both can implement computational  
> histories/information patterns that are the basis of consciousness.

All right, but then the "universe" again has to be given by the UD,  
and in fact any UD. It remains possible, plausible and probable that  
some sub-UD could play some role, but they can be used (if we want to  
solve the mind body problem, or not loose its comp explanation) only  
internal justification (based on measure, or on defining arithmetical  
version of the first and thirs points of view, etc.).

> To me the non-existence of white rabbits might be explained by the  
> much higher frequency of "histories" ...

Right. I agree.

> ... that have simple rules,

This is ambiguous. I agree, given that the "universe" is just a tiny  
part arithmetic. The simple rule are mainly the law of addition and  
the law of multiplication, modus ponens, etc. We don't need induction  
rule nor lobianity for the "universe".

> and randomized initial states.

This I don't see at all.

>  A mathematical object is defined out there where the initial  
> condition is this universe exactly as it is now, only a giant white  
> rabbit is standing before you, but such mathematical objects that  
> start at such a highly ordered state that contains all life on  
> Earth, and brains with consistent memories would be very rare.

Yes but they appear an infinity of times, and have continua of  
consistent extensions. If we want keep comp, we have to justify why  
they are rare, and this without postulating any special little program  
(special means here different from the UD). Keep in mind that we  
cannot be aware of the delays made by the UD, (or of the lenght of  
proof of Sigma_1 proposition in a tiny part of arithmetic (cf the  
arithmetical hypostases).
No doubt little programs and little numbers plays key role, but big  
numbers are there, and we cannot just decide they can't influence our  
consciousness because they do, only we have to justify why their role  
is rare, or annihilate itself, etc.

> Much more common would be histories that began with simple unordered  
> initial conditions but with the right properties for life to evolve.

Perhaps, but if true, that has be to be justified the way mentioned  

> The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly  
> speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there  
> is a big price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe  
> about the body and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the  
> existence of a lawful structure, we have to explain it from the  
> theory of mind/numbers.
> Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the  
> seven step of the thought experiment/experience?
> I think I so, perhaps my response above would better clarify whether  
> or not there is something I am missing.

I think you have a very good understanding of many important things  
here, notably concerning the relation between consciousness and  
physicalness, but you have still, perhaps, a rest of physicalist  
conception of the "physical universe". With comp, physics emerges,  
although logically, not temporally, from the stable coherent  
conceptions of reality machines (numbers) can build relatively to each  
other. It may be that your conclusion is right, and that some sub-UD  
wins the "the battle for the right measure". I am ok with that, but  
that's out of topic I would say. The fact is that if you are true, you  
have to justify it by an internal measure defined on the universal  
deployment. No program, but the UD itself can prevent consciousness to  
escape continuously toward the work of the big numbers, and the very  
big numbers, and the very very big numbers.
Only a strict ultrafinitist, like Torgny Tholerus perhaps, can escape  
the infinitiy of those big numbers, but then he has to abandon comp  
for other reasons. Do you see this? It is really a consequence of the  
step 2 already: the impossible awareness (first person knowledge) of  
the many ---very long--- delays intrinsic to the working of the UD. We  
belong to *all* stories which access our computational states.



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