On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
>> explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing
>> emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable.
> Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you
> about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like "If
> I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is
> false" Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp
> is true that implies "I != universe". I look forward to your explanation of
> why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the
> Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are
> emulable in addition to the observers they might contain?
> Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7)
> and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if
> the notion of universe still make sense at all.
> How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state
> glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you
> should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or
> exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If
> it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been
> evacuated already.
I don't consider myself or any observer glued to any single reality, yet I
still believe coherent realities exist. See below.
How does the computability of the universe relate to the evacuation of white
> If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the
> comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white
> rabbits, they are there in "arithmetic". We can only hope (if we want keep
> mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why
> the white rabbits are *relatively* rare.
> And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary,
> what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist
> Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a
> physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and
> anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation
> of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true
> (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from
> computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological
> The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that
> QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the
> most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the
> many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain
> The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions
> of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those
> Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. But if
> we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have to extract it
> from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We
> cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any
> computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a priori
> indicates that the result is a computable things.
I think we are in general agreement regarding the idea that a first person
experience belongs to many (perhaps infinite) computational histories. I
think the confusion may have come down to language, in particular how we
defined "universe". I see now you take "universe" to mean the perceived
environment that appears as a first person experience to observers. I also
see how this collection of possible histories can
be incomputable/unknowable. Whereas, I was defining "universe" to mean a
single consistent computational/mathematical history which may implement
computations that form first person experiences. These first person view
points, by mechanism, would not be unique to any particular history, but
belong to all histories which implement the same computations. Individual
histories, as I see it, may or may not be computable, but both can implement
computational histories/information patterns that are the basis of
To me the non-existence of white rabbits might be explained by the much
higher frequency of "histories" that have simple rules, and randomized
initial states. A mathematical object is defined out there where the
initial condition is this universe exactly as it is now, only a giant white
rabbit is standing before you, but such mathematical objects that start at
such a highly ordered state that contains all life on Earth, and brains with
consistent memories would be very rare. Much more common would
be histories that began with simple unordered initial conditions but with
the right properties for life to evolve.
> The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly
> speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there is a big
> price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe about the body
> and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the existence of a lawful
> structure, we have to explain it from the theory of mind/numbers.
> Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the seven
> step of the thought experiment/experience?
I think I so, perhaps my response above would better clarify whether or not
there is something I am missing.
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