On 11 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>    PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will  
>>> have to
>>>    explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am
>>>    Turing
>>>    emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask)
>>> you about several days ago.  But it was phrased differently,
>>> something like "If I am the universe and the universe is not turning
>>> emulable then comp is false"  Here you are saying the universe is  
>>> not
>>> turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies "I !=  
>>> universe".  I
>>> look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing
>>> emulable.  BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are
>>> there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to
>>> the observers they might contain?
>>
>>
>> Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp
>> UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument,  
>> you
>> should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all.
>>
>> How can you be sure all the computation going through your current
>> state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or
>> 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a  
>> universe
>> makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should
>> it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the
>> white rabbits have been evacuated already.
>>
>> If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that
>> the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those
>> white rabbits, they are there in "arithmetic". We can only hope (if  
>> we
>> want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is  
>> an
>> explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare.
>>
>> And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the
>> contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the
>> Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the
>> existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways
>> to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to
>> extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing)
>> computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have
>> to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the
>> geometrical and topological background.
>>
>> The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is
>> that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm
>> some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many
>> evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical
>> behavior of the certain propositions.
>>
>> The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on  the quantum Universal
>> solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we
>> know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum
>> white rabbits*.
>
> Unfortunately, I don't think we do know that, c.f. the paper by Dowker
> and Kent on Griffith's Consistent Histories interpretation.
>
> http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/9412/9412067v2.pdf
>
> Brent

If Dowker and Kent were right, in that pdf, it would mean QM itself is  
already in contradiction with the aristotelian conception of the  
physical universe. I would not have dared to a such incredible  
confirmation of comp. But I am not convince by Dowker and Brent  
critics, except on some point about Omn├Ęs. In my opinion Everett +  
Gleason + Feynman already solve the quantum white rabbit problem, and  
so beautifully, that I always take this is as an evidence that the  
comp physics will be mainly QM. Again, if Dowker and Kent were  
correct, and if they were not using the conscience/matter identity  
principle at the start, their argument would lead that comp has to  
give rise to a correction of QM, or abandonned. But I doubt it, and I  
don't think many have accepted Kent reasoning. See Wallace papers for  
a more correct analysis, imo.

IF even QM has still white rabbits, this is a case in favor of comp,  
where the white rabbits cannot be hunted away even by postulating any  
theory. They have to be hunted away from pure computer science, in a  
purely internal way.

That pure QM does not solve all problems, in particular the mind-body  
problem, should be obvious. All my point is that Everett needs comp,  
and he does not take comp seriously enough. Indeed, if comp is true,  
and if QM is true, QM has to be justified from comp without  
postulating a universe.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to