Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>> <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
>>     PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
>>     explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am
>>     Turing
>>     emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. 
>> Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) 
>> you about several days ago.  But it was phrased differently, 
>> something like "If I am the universe and the universe is not turning 
>> emulable then comp is false"  Here you are saying the universe is not 
>> turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies "I != universe".  I 
>> look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing 
>> emulable.  BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are 
>> there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to 
>> the observers they might contain?
> Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp 
> UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you 
> should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all.
> How can you be sure all the computation going through your current 
> state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 
> 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe 
> makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should 
> it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the 
> white rabbits have been evacuated already.
> If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that 
> the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those 
> white rabbits, they are there in "arithmetic". We can only hope (if we 
> want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an 
> explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare.
> And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the 
> contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the 
> Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the 
> existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways 
> to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to 
> extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) 
> computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have 
> to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the 
> geometrical and topological background.
> The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is 
> that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm 
> some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many 
> evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical 
> behavior of the certain propositions.
> The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on  the quantum Universal 
> solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we 
> know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum 
> white rabbits*.

Unfortunately, I don't think we do know that, c.f. the paper by Dowker 
and Kent on Griffith's Consistent Histories interpretation.


> But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have 
> to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of 
> white rabbits. We cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front of the UD, 
> localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of 
> them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable 
> things.
> The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly 
> speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there is 
> a big price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe about 
> the body and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the 
> existence of a lawful structure, we have to explain it from the theory 
> of mind/numbers.
> Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the 
> seven step of the thought experiment/experience?
> Don't hesitate to ask again if this does not help,  I feel I miss what 
> you don't understand. 
> Bruno
> <>
> >

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