On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
> explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am
> emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable.
> Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask)
> you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently,
> something like "If I am the universe and the universe is not turning
> emulable then comp is false" Here you are saying the universe is
> not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies "I !=
> universe". I look forward to your explanation of why the universe
> is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett
> Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are
> emulable in addition to the observers they might contain?
Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp
UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you
should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all.
How can you be sure all the computation going through your current
state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or
1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe
makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should
it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the
white rabbits have been evacuated already.
If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that
the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those
white rabbits, they are there in "arithmetic". We can only hope (if we
want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an
explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare.
And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the
contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the
Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the
existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways
to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to
extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing)
computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have
to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the
geometrical and topological background.
The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is
that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm
some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many
evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical
behavior of the certain propositions.
The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal
solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we
know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum
white rabbits*. But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate
the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate
vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front
of the UD, localize ourselves in any computational histories, we
belong to all of them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result
is a computable things.
The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly
speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there is
a big price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe about
the body and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the
existence of a lawful structure, we have to explain it from the theory
Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the
seven step of the thought experiment/experience?
Don't hesitate to ask again if this does not help, I feel I miss what
you don't understand.
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