*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous 
aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions 
of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of 
equations? Gosh.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote:
>> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
>>> *Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, 
>>> whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that 
>>> substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical 
>>> existence? 
>>> *
>> That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that 
>> intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the 
>> (once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of "life 
>> force", sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary 
>> for life.
>> I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves 
>> fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is supposed 
>> to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden is on them 
>> to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to have, and 
>> why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill. I've never 
>> heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a lot of is, 
>> "Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds of things 
>> that can count as a physical substrate." But that's just a 
>> restatement of the position that needs to be defended.
>> When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit 
>> the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's 
>> descriptions of the life-force.
> I agree 99% with you, and I have myself in my papers and in this list 
> compared very often "materialism" with "vitalism". In generally I do 
> that after the seventh step of the UDA. At that step people should 
> understand that, in case a concrete UD is executed integrally 
> (infinite task) in our material universe, then,  to predict what a pen 
> will do if we drop it, we have to look at the entire set of possible 
> computations going through our current state (when in from of that 
> pen) OK?
> Now, are you aware that the MGA is just an argument to logically show 
> that the material invocation, cannot indeed be used to contradict of 
> weaken the consequence of those 7 steps?
> No need (for you!) of MGA, if you have already the (correct) intuition 
> that using materialism just cannot work. The use of matter is indeed 
> akin to the (fraudulous) use of God for explaining the existence of 
> the universe. That explain nothing. But we do have a very strong 
> intuition that matter does exist, and it is not so simple (and indeed 
> quite subtle) to precisely show that primitive or fundamental matter 
> is a red herring both for the mind and the body part of the mind-body 
> problem. OK?
> I will begin by a step 0, for the MGA, where I sum up what should be 
> completely clear before beginning the MGA itself. I have also to 
> explain what the MGA does not. For example the MGA does not prove the 
> inexistence of matter, it proves only to irrelevance of the notion of 
> matter concerning again both mind and body, consciousness and physics.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
> >

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