On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
>>>> <snip>
>>>>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
>>> to run
>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
>> mathematical run.
> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of  
> logical
> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical  
> run" can only
> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run  
> that makes
> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?

The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run  
you have a notion of first step, second step, etc.

>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the  
> computer provides
> the succession.

That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical  
reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you  
have to say no to the doctor, or to point on the point that you don't  
understand in the UDA.
You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an  
explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless  
you put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but  
then you say no to the doctor).

>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>>> there would be
>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>>> would probably
>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
>> will extract from the numbers.
> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means  
> the values of
> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my  
> galaxy
> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state  
> over an
> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is  
> the size of
> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment  
> of time will
> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a  
> failure to
> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's  
> comparable to
> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.

Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed  
in making you say directly "no" to the doctor. In that case you just  
say no to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.

  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or  
false (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent  
My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of  
number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to  
drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable,  
making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".

I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are  
incompatible, though.


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