Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com >>>>> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote: >>>>> <snip> >>>>>> >>>>>> in a computer program. But a computer program requires a computer >>>> to run >>> >>> >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a >>> mathematical run. >> >> But isn't that the crux of the question? Mathematics is a set of logical >> relations - which have no temporal component. So a "mathematical run" >> can only >> be analogous to a physical run. So what is it in a mathematical run >> that makes >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object? > > > The notion of step, and successor of a step. For a mathematical run you > have a notion of first step, second step, etc. > > > > > >> >> >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run. >> >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not >> implemented. When it is run on a computer, the physics of the >> computer provides >> the succession. > > > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you > have to say no to the doctor,

Why? The doctor proposes a physical implementation. >or to point on the point that you don't > understand in the UDA. > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not. > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you > say no to the doctor). > >>> >>> >>>> >>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that >>>> there would be >>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one >>>> would probably >>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms. >>> >>> >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you >>> will extract from the numbers. >> >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined. That means the >> values of >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my galaxy >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over an >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is >> the size of >> the region. So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of >> time will >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a >> failure to >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation. It's >> comparable to >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state. > > > Are you stopping at UDA step 1? No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a copy of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap in my consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state (plus some environment), but not the former. > With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in > making you say directly "no" to the doctor. Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in consciousness? :-) Brent >In that case you just say no > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that. > > I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there). > My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of > number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to > drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable, > making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific". > > I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, > though. Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links? Brent > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---