Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com 
>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:
>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer  
>>>> to run
>>>
>>>
>>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a  
>>> mathematical run.
>>
>> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of logical
>> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical run" 
>> can only
>> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run 
>> that makes
>> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
> 
> 
> The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run you 
> have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>
>>
>>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers  
>>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.  
>>
>> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
>> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the 
>> computer provides
>> the succession.
> 
> 
> That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical 
> reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you 
> have to say no to the doctor, 

Why?  The doctor proposes a physical implementation.

>or to point on the point that you don't 
> understand in the UDA.
> You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an 
> explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
> Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you 
> put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you 
> say no to the doctor).
> 
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
>>>> there would be
>>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one  
>>>> would probably
>>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>>
>>>
>>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are  
>>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you  
>>> will extract from the numbers.
>>
>> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means the 
>> values of
>> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my galaxy
>> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over an
>> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is 
>> the size of
>> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of 
>> time will
>> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a 
>> failure to
>> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's 
>> comparable to
>> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
> 
> 
> Are you stopping at UDA step 1? 

No.  There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a 
copy 
of me within this world.  I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap in my 
consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state 
(plus 
some environment), but not the former.

>  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in 
> making you say directly "no" to the doctor. 

Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in consciousness? 
:-)

Brent

>In that case you just say no 
> to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
> 
>  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false 
> (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there). 
> My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of 
> number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to 
> drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable, 
> making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
> 
> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, 
> though.

Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links?

Brent

> 
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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