I should add that in the case of the digital version, as I said earlier, the causal link is in no way the physical computer, but the program and its state.
2009/1/18 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> > > > 2009/1/18 Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> > >> > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >> >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <[email protected] >> >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >>>>> <snip> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> in a computer program. But a computer program requires a computer >> >>>> to run >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a >> >>> mathematical run. >> >> >> >> But isn't that the crux of the question? Mathematics is a set of >> logical >> >> relations - which have no temporal component. So a "mathematical run" >> >> can only >> >> be analogous to a physical run. So what is it in a mathematical run >> >> that makes >> >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object? >> > >> > >> > The notion of step, and successor of a step. For a mathematical run you >> > have a notion of first step, second step, etc. >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers >> >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run. >> >> >> >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not >> >> implemented. When it is run on a computer, the physics of the >> >> computer provides >> >> the succession. >> > >> > >> > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical >> > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you >> > have to say no to the doctor, >> >> Why? The doctor proposes a physical implementation. > > > Yes and I thought I did show you that which physical implementation is used > doesn't matter ? or would you say you would accept a digital copy of > yourself on ARM but not on Core 2 DUO ? > >> >> >> >or to point on the point that you don't >> > understand in the UDA. >> > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an >> > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not. >> > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you >> > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you >> > say no to the doctor). >> > >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that >> >>>> there would be >> >>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one >> >>>> would probably >> >>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are >> >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you >> >>> will extract from the numbers. >> >> >> >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined. That means the >> >> values of >> >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my >> galaxy >> >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over >> an >> >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is >> >> the size of >> >> the region. So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of >> >> time will >> >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a >> >> failure to >> >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation. It's >> >> comparable to >> >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state. >> > >> > >> > Are you stopping at UDA step 1? >> >> No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making >> a copy >> of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap >> in my >> consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state >> (plus >> some environment), but not the former. >> > > Ok let's accept that for your first copy (biological brain copied into > digital form) you did occur a conscionsness gap because of that... but then > I have a digital copy of you, and if you still believe it is you, I can put > your digital copy running on my bananas computer, agreed ? and no more gap > occurs copying you because I'm external to your simulated brain/environnment > running in my bananas computer. > > >> >> > With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in >> > making you say directly "no" to the doctor. >> >> Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in >> consciousness? :-) >> > > No, just because you don't believe that the digital version is still you. > > Regards, > Quentin > > >> >> Brent >> >> >In that case you just say no >> > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that. >> > >> > I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false >> > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there). >> > My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of >> > number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to >> > drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable, >> > making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific". >> > >> > I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, >> > though. >> >> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links? >> >> Brent >> >> > >> > Bruno >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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