I should add that in the case of the digital version, as I said earlier, the
causal link is in no way the physical computer, but the program and its
state.

2009/1/18 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>

>
>
> 2009/1/18 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
>> >>>>> <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote:
>> >>>>> <snip>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
>> >>>> to run
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
>> >>> mathematical run.
>> >>
>> >> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of
>> logical
>> >> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical run"
>> >> can only
>> >> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run
>> >> that makes
>> >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
>> >
>> >
>> > The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run you
>> > have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
>> >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
>> >>
>> >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
>> >> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the
>> >> computer provides
>> >> the succession.
>> >
>> >
>> > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical
>> > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you
>> > have to say no to the doctor,
>>
>> Why?  The doctor proposes a physical implementation.
>
>
> Yes and I thought I did show you that which physical implementation is used
> doesn't matter ? or would you say you would accept a digital copy of
> yourself on ARM but not on Core 2 DUO ?
>
>>
>>
>> >or to point on the point that you don't
>> > understand in the UDA.
>> > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an
>> > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
>> > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you
>> > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you
>> > say no to the doctor).
>> >
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>> >>>> there would be
>> >>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>> >>>> would probably
>> >>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
>> >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
>> >>> will extract from the numbers.
>> >>
>> >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means the
>> >> values of
>> >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my
>> galaxy
>> >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over
>> an
>> >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is
>> >> the size of
>> >> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of
>> >> time will
>> >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a
>> >> failure to
>> >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's
>> >> comparable to
>> >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
>> >
>> >
>> > Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
>>
>> No.  There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making
>> a copy
>> of me within this world.  I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap
>> in my
>> consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state
>> (plus
>> some environment), but not the former.
>>
>
> Ok let's accept that for your first copy (biological brain copied into
> digital form) you did occur a conscionsness gap because of that... but then
> I have a digital copy of you, and if you still believe it is you, I can put
> your digital copy running on my bananas computer, agreed ? and no more gap
> occurs copying you because I'm external to your simulated brain/environnment
> running in my bananas computer.
>
>
>>
>> >  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in
>> > making you say directly "no" to the doctor.
>>
>> Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in
>> consciousness? :-)
>>
>
> No, just because you don't believe that the digital version is still you.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> >In that case you just say no
>> > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
>> >
>> >  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false
>> > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there).
>> > My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of
>> > number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to
>> > drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable,
>> > making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
>> >
>> > I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible,
>> > though.
>>
>> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> >
>> > Bruno
>> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > >
>>
>>
>> >>
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to