2009/1/18 Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> > >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: > >>> > >>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >>>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker <[email protected] > >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >>>>> <snip> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> in a computer program. But a computer program requires a computer > >>>> to run > >>> > >>> > >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a > >>> mathematical run. > >> > >> But isn't that the crux of the question? Mathematics is a set of > logical > >> relations - which have no temporal component. So a "mathematical run" > >> can only > >> be analogous to a physical run. So what is it in a mathematical run > >> that makes > >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object? > > > > > > The notion of step, and successor of a step. For a mathematical run you > > have a notion of first step, second step, etc. > > > > > > > > > > > >> > >> > >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers > >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run. > >> > >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not > >> implemented. When it is run on a computer, the physics of the > >> computer provides > >> the succession. > > > > > > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical > > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you > > have to say no to the doctor, > > Why? The doctor proposes a physical implementation.
Yes and I thought I did show you that which physical implementation is used doesn't matter ? or would you say you would accept a digital copy of yourself on ARM but not on Core 2 DUO ? > > > >or to point on the point that you don't > > understand in the UDA. > > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an > > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not. > > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you > > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you > > say no to the doctor). > > > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that > >>>> there would be > >>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one > >>>> would probably > >>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms. > >>> > >>> > >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are > >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you > >>> will extract from the numbers. > >> > >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined. That means the > >> values of > >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my > galaxy > >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over > an > >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is > >> the size of > >> the region. So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of > >> time will > >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a > >> failure to > >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation. It's > >> comparable to > >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state. > > > > > > Are you stopping at UDA step 1? > > No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a > copy > of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap > in my > consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state > (plus > some environment), but not the former. > Ok let's accept that for your first copy (biological brain copied into digital form) you did occur a conscionsness gap because of that... but then I have a digital copy of you, and if you still believe it is you, I can put your digital copy running on my bananas computer, agreed ? and no more gap occurs copying you because I'm external to your simulated brain/environnment running in my bananas computer. > > > With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in > > making you say directly "no" to the doctor. > > Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in > consciousness? :-) > No, just because you don't believe that the digital version is still you. Regards, Quentin > > Brent > > >In that case you just say no > > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that. > > > > I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false > > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there). > > My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of > > number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to > > drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable, > > making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific". > > > > I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, > > though. > > Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links? > > Brent > > > > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
