On 12 Feb 2009, at 05:38, Tom Caylor wrote:

>
> But of course you would worry just as much if the clone were replaced
> by a zombie...  I guess that gets back to the distinction between
> first person and third person.


It seems to me that is the problem indeed. At the same time, it seems  
obvious to me that if you drop that distinction, you are eliminating  
the first person. Then we are not just mortal, we are already dead.

Bruno


>
>
> On Feb 11, 9:05 pm, Tom Caylor <daddycay...@msn.com> wrote:
>> The effects of have clones is interesting, though, regardless of the
>> "sapping strength" notion.  You would have reason to worry about  
>> being
>> killed if there were clones and then a "shell game" was played with
>> you being mixed up with the clones, and then all of the "yous" were
>> killed except one.  All of the "yous" would have reason to worry.
>> This has implications on ethics of cloning and killing clones.
>> As far as measure, it seems that having a clone of you and killing  
>> one
>> of you while you were asleep would be equivalent (w.r.t how much you
>> should worry at least) to not having any clones and someone saying
>> they were going to roll a die and if it came up odd they would kill
>> you.
>>
>> Tom
>>
>> On Feb 11, 8:44 pm, Jack Mallah <jackmal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>> You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one  
>>>> version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up  
>>>> tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run  
>>>> today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying  
>>>> that I might not wake up tomorrow.
>>
>>> You won't know this evening if you are one of the "extra versions"  
>>> or the original.  So yes, in that situation, you will probably not  
>>> be around tomorrow.  Only the original will.
>>
>>>> The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength.
>>
>>> Not at all.  I guess that is a joke?
>>
>>> Creating more copies, then getting rid of the same number, does  
>>> not result in a net decrease in measure.  That is why the movie  
>>> "The Prestige" bears no resemblance whatsoever to QS despite  
>>> rumors to the contrary.
>>
>>> If you create extra copies and leave them alive, there is a net  
>>> increase in measure.  That is equivalent to new people being born  
>>> even if they have your memories.  This once happenned to Will  
>>> Riker on Star Trek: TNG.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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