As Stathis and Quentin wrote, we have approached the core of the 

You (Jack) seem to have a very "quaint" idea of personal identity - some 
kind of essentialism. Strange that you hold that theory and call talk of 
1st person/3rd person distinction "sloganeering".

It seems, perhaps, that the sloganeers have a much more scientific 
concept of personal identity than you do?


Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of 
>> me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra 
>> versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go 
>> to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. 
> You won't know this evening if you are one of the "extra versions" or the 
> original.  So yes, in that situation, you will probably not be around 
> tomorrow.  Only the original will.
>> The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength.
> Not at all.  I guess that is a joke?
> Creating more copies, then getting rid of the same number, does not result in 
> a net decrease in measure.  That is why the movie "The Prestige" bears no 
> resemblance whatsoever to QS despite rumors to the contrary.
> If you create extra copies and leave them alive, there is a net increase in 
> measure.  That is equivalent to new people being born even if they have your 
> memories.  This once happenned to Will Riker on Star Trek: TNG.
> > 

Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/

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