> There are two copies of me in perfect lockstep, A1 and A2. I'm one of
> these copies and not the other (though I don't know which). Suppose
> I'm A1 and I decide to teleport 100km away. That means A1 disappears
> and a new copy, B, appears 100m away. I'm happy, since I feel I've
> traveled 100km with little effort. If I am instead A2, I go through
> exactly the same process: A2 disappears, B appears 100km away, and I'm
> happy. If I'm A1 the presence or absence of A2 does not make any
> difference to me, and if I'm A2 the presence or absence of A1 doesn't
> make any difference to me. It doesn't make sense to say that the
> presence of the other A copy will diminish my chances of ending up as
> B, or diminish my quantity or quality of consciousness once I end up
> as B.
I think Brent's "vanishing" is meant to refer to 3rd person perspective.
From 1POV, Stathis is correct in pressing the button - he will never
But if the button _really_ does some work - that is, reduce measure (it
is only a thought experiment of course) that would mean that under
3-Plural-POV there must indeed be "vanishing" or termination or whatever
- else, there is no sense in which one could say measure has been
reduced (if it is neither noticeable in 3-Plural POV nor in 1POV. If one
reduces measure strictly in God's eye viewpoint without it being
3-Plural noticeable, it seems to me that you also have to reduce measure
of all people polyplicated with you - then symmetry would be restored;
but that goes beyond the original proposed thought experiment).
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