On 30 Jul 2009, at 22:46, 1Z wrote:
> On 27 July, 18:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 27 Jul 2009, at 14:57, David Nyman wrote:
>>> On 27 July, 09:31, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> The UDA is a reasoning which shows that once we postulate an
>>>> "ontological" physical universal, it is impossible to recover the
>>>> first person from it
>>> Do you mean to say that we can't recover the 1-person from a
>>> universe on the assumption that the mind is a 'computation' executed
>>> by elements of a physical brain, or that it can't be recovered *in
>>> manner* on the assumption of 'physical ontology'? I've always
>>> the former - which is the one attacked in your thought experiments;
>>> the latter would be a much stronger and more startling claim, to say
>>> the least.
>> It is the former. Typical counter-example are provided by most
>> religions, but they have to be anti-comp.
>> Even with comp, you can always add a physical ontology, but you
>> use it to explain any correlation between consciousness and what
>> happen in that physical ontological universe.
> Yes you can:
No, you can't. UDA is a proof that you can't. May be you could tell us
which step you believe to be incorrect in the UDA?
> the physical brain executes the computation, so naturally
> the consciousness resulting from the computation and the brain
> are correlated.
So you can correlate a consciousness to a "brain". We can agree on
this, locally, it is part of comp. The point is that you cannot attach
ONE brain to consciousness, but an infinity of them, all existing in
arithmetic. By which I mean all existing in the sense that their
existence is provable in Robinson Arithmetic, which is a theory on
which all the mathematicians (platonists and intuitionists as well)
> As usual, when you say "comp" you mean "comp+plat".
I thought I answered this clearly on the FOR list recently.
By comp I mean digital mechanism, i.e. "yes doctor" (= to believe we
can survive a digital body/brain graft), + Church Thesis (which
The "plat" I am using is just the necessary excluded middle principle
needed to accept that propositions of the form P v ~P have a truth
value TRUE which does not depend on me. Church thesis needs this to
Even Hamerov and Searle accepts (implictly) such a weak form of comp.
To my knowledge only Penrose does not.
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