Flammarion wrote:
> On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> Peter Jones wrote:
>>> On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 1Z wrote:
>>>>>> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
>>>>>> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
>>>>>> explain.
>>>> But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the 
>>>> evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical models of 
>>>> particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions about 
>>>> observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly 
>>>> mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever 
>>>> (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our 
>>>> empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the 
>>>> abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions about 
>>>> this behavior).
>>> Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
>>> physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
>>> it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
>>> problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
>>> universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
>>> instantiates
>>> that particualar amtehamtical structure.
>> But then it seems like you're really just talking about consciousness and 
>> qualia--of all the mathematically possible universes containing possible 
>> self-aware observers, only in some (or one) are these possible observers 
>> actually real in the sense of having qualia (and there qualia being 
>> influenced by other, possibly nonconsious elements of the mathematical 
>> universe they are a part of).
> No.. I don't need the hypothesis that WR universes are there but
> unobserved.
>> There's no need to have a middleman called "primary matter", such that only 
>> some (or one) mathematical possible universes are actually instantianted in 
>> primary matter, and only those instantiated in primary matter give rise to 
>> qualia.
> There is no absolute need, but there are advantages. For instance, the
> many-wolder might have to admit
> the existence of zombie universes -- universes that containt
> *apparent* intelligent lige that is nonetheless unconscious--
> in order to account for the non-obseration of WR universes.
>> If you *are* going to add unobservable middlemen like this,
> I don't concede that PM is unobservable. What exists is material, what
> is immaterial does not
> exist. There is therefore a large set of facts about matter. Moreover,
> the many-worlders extra
> universes *have* to be unobservable one way or the other, since they
> are not observed!
>> there's no real logical justification for having only one--you could say 
>> "only some mathematically possible universes are instantiated in primary 
>> asfgh, and only some of those give rise to qwertyuiop, and only the ones 
>> with quertyuiop can give rise to zxcvbn, and only ones with zxcvbn can give 
>> rise to qualia and consciousness".
> Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
> not about
> explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
> contingency as the price
> paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both*
> explanatory
> desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which
> Everythingism wins.

But parsimony in *theory* is what is desirable.  Almost any physics explanation 
of how the 
universe came to be is going to predict the existence of many universes.  If 
it's based on 
QM is will be probabilistic.  So then there is a tension with parsimony between 
unparsimonious addition to the theory, i.e. "and just one thing happens", and 
keeping the 
theory parsimonious, but allowing an unparsimonious ontology in which "they all 

>>  > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary 
>> asdfgh".
>>> You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
>>> arbitrary.
>> My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" 
>> which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really 
>> you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are 
>> completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which 
>> were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal 
>> properties (including quantitative ones).
> I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
> properties could be accounted for
> as non-mathematical attributes of PM)

I think this is a category mistake.  Mathematical attributes belong to *the 
or PM, not to PM.  And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to 
be precise 
and consistent.


>>>> And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between this 
>>>> "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I don't 
>>>> see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with primary 
>>>> matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or qualia but 
>>>> no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then why shouldn't 
>>>> we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)
>>> The second possibility is ruled out because it predicts White Rabbits.
>> I don't agree, there's no reason you couldn't postulate a measure
> Yes there is: you have to justify from first principles and not just
> postulate it.
> The problem is that if all possible maths exists, all possible
> measures exist...
> you can't pick out one as being, for some contingent reason "the"
> measure....
>> on the set of mathematical possibilities which determined the likelihood 
>> they would actually be experienced by conscious observers--this measure 
>> might be such that white-rabbit worlds would be very improbable, it might 
>> even pick out a unique mathematically possible universe where the possible 
>> observers are actually conscious, while assigning zero measure to all other 
>> possibilities.
> So you are appealing to the unknown relationship between maths and
> qualia, rather than the unknown properties
> of matter?
> > 

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