2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
>> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
>> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
>> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
>> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
>> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
>> opposite is the case,
>
> That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
> there is a difference between assuming something because you
> think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
> its consequences match observation (abduction)

One might indeed adduce this distinction in preferring one approach
over the other, but it isn't forced.  Indeed, in the case of the MGA,
if one accepts the deduction and retains one's commitment to CTM, then
the abduction is only to be expected.  But if you agree with my
formulation, I'm confused by what you go on to say below:

>> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
>> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
>> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
>> computational theory.
>
>
> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> well as CTM.

Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
one case.  If you can show where he goes wrong, you may consider
CTM+PM has been defended.  OTOH if one agrees with him, this obscures
the association of consciousness with physics 'qua computatio'.  In
this case, one could choose to abandon either CTM or PM.  If the
latter, the move from MGA to UDA requires the reversal of the
theoretical primacy of matter and (at least a branch of) mathematics.

When you respond "That is pretty much what I have been saying" you are
agreeing, aren't you, that what you mean by Platonism - whether or not
you accept the MGA as motivating its entailment by CTM - is just a
theoretical commitment to the primacy of the mathematical, as opposed
to the material?  And this seems pretty much indistinguishable from
Arithmetical Realism to me.

>> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> explanatory scheme.
>
> Who's been doing that?

This seems an odd question at this stage.  I thought you were
insisting that Bruno needs some metaphysically primitive sense of
Platonism to justify the UDA.

>>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
>> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
>> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
>> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
>
> Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
> It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
> irrefutable certainty.

Well then, surely we can agree.  One finds grounds for preferring a
theoretical point of departure, and then one gets down to work.  Comp
is open to empirical refutation, so it's research.  Is your problem
that MGA is a "declaration of irrefutable certainty"?  If so, it
shouldn't be.  Like any deductive argument, it is open to refutation
if one can find an error.  Further, even if one can't, this doesn't
force a commitment to Arithmetical Realism, it simply puts the
coherency of CTM+PM into doubt.  Either conclusion might motivate a
preference for one research approach over another.

David

>
>
>
> On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2009/9/17 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>
>> > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
>> > is ontological.
>>
>> > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
>> > maths.
>> > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
>> > certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
>> > taken
>> > literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
>> > the material
>> > in the first posting indicates
>>
>> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
>> starting assumptions.  If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
>> the primacy of the physical, then the status of mathematics is
>> obviously rendered formal or metaphorical with respect to this.  OTOH
>> if one starts from the theoretical primacy of number - irrespective of
>> whether one labels such primacy 'arithmetical' or 'platonic' - the
>> opposite is the case,
>
> That is pretty much what I have been saying. But note that
> there is a difference between assuming something because you
> think it is incontrovertible (deduction) and assuming it because
> its consequences match observation (abduction)
>
>> and indeed Bruno argues precisely how and why,
>> on the basis of the MGA, one cannot take the status of matter (as
>> opposed to its appearances) 'literally' from the perspective of
>> computational theory.
>
>
> No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> well as CTM.
>
>> In either case there may be what one considers defensible grounds for
>> a commitment to a particular direction of inference, but ISTM that
>> further insistence on the metaphysical 'primitiveness' of one's point
>> of departure is entirely tangential to the distinctiveness of either
>> explanatory scheme.
>
> Who's been doing that?
>
>>  The opinions cited in the first posting assume
>> the first of these theoretical commitments and hence choose to take
>> the primacy of matter as their inferential fons et origo.  Comp takes
>> the opposite position.  The rest is a research programme, isn't it?
>
> Yes. For my money, metaphysics is a  subject-matter.
> It is not an epistemological modus-operandi involving declarations of
> irrefutable certainty.
> >
>

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