> Are you physicalist?

I just don't know.
All my everyday experience points towards physicalism: I'm a brain,
embodied in a physical body, embedded in a physical environment and
evolved via several billion year selection process. All the
constituents of my mind could be explained in the evolutionary terms
as "devices" that promoted the survival of my ancestor's genes.
>From the other hand, all the scientific knowledge imo points towards
some kind of "digital physics". For example, it's much much easier to
just accept modern high-energy physics as a elaborate pure
mathematical theory than try to understand it in the everyday terms of
"material world".

> Have you read Everett? There are already physicists who describe "reality"
> as a flux of information which differentiate in many histories, sometimes
> recombining by amnesia, etc.
> You may read the book by Russell Standish theory of Nothing.
> The book Mind's I, ed. by Hofstadter and Dennett is a good introduction to
> computationalism.
> Stathis mentioned Parfit's "reasons and persons" recently on the FOR list,
> where we discuss on similar "many-reality" conception of reality. I would
> recommend it too. In particular you may read David Deutsch's book "the
> fabric of Reality".
> Gunther Greindl has put some more advanced references on the web page of the
> list.
> Are you aware of computer science and mathematical logic?
> You could be interested by my own contribution, which I explain on this
> list, see
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

I didn't read Everett and Deutsch but I'm aware of MWI.
I skimmed over Theory of Nothing some time ago and, to be honest, I
didn't like to, partially due to Quantum Immortality thing - it was my
first encounter with the subject and it seemed like a worst kind of
unscientific wishful thinking. But maybe I should give it another,
this time more serious try.

I'll make an attempt to follow your UDA steps and can accept comp as a
_hypothesis_, but now I'm highly skeptical about computationalism as a
valid theory of consciousness.
Every time I think about it I come to the "simulated thunderstorm is
NOT a real thunderstorm" argument (I don't know the other name, for
the first time I read about in some interview with Searle). It's easy
for me to accept the possibility of conscious robot (I'm such a robot)
but it's hard to accept the possibility of conscious "pure" (as in CS
i.e. without side effects) computer program, as computationalism
implies (if I understand it right).


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