Dear Bruno, on diverse lists (I cannot call them 'science-branches' since lately most domains are discussed in considering aspects of several of such on the diverse discussion-lists) - CONCEPTS (I wish I knew a better word) appear by different content.
If somebody has the time and feels like (knows how to) do it, a brief reconsiderational ID listing would help us outsiders to reconfirm what "WE" mean by *Comp* - (computing, computer-universal or not,) The application of (=your relevance of) the *Church* thesis *Universa*l machine - BTW: machine, or God, as in (our) theology *White rabbit*, (and I don't even dare write:) *numbers,* - and in not much than 1-2 lines(!!!) ea: *UD, UDA, AUDA*, with: hints to "YES" *to the doctor*, and *maybe some more* - * which the 'old listers' apply here with ease (yet *maybe(!)* in their modified i.e. personalised taste?) - newcomers. however, usually first misinterpret into 'other' *vernaculars*. (It is my several decade long research experience to sit down once in a while and recap (recoop?) the terms used in the daily efforts. They change by the *(ab?)*use and re-realizing their original content may push the research effort ahead from a stagnant hole it falls into inevitably during most "routine" thinking. - In doing so, almost all the time there occurred an "AHA". One cannot do it privately and alone. We cannot slip out from our skin. I did it with someone knowledgeable in the broader field (maybe even a fresh graduate?) or on a public lecture, where questions and opposite opinions could be expected. Best for the hooiday season: this may be a present for Chirstmas. On St. Nicholas Day John Mikes On Sat, Dec 5, 2009 at 4:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 05 Dec 2009, at 21:00, Rex Allen wrote: > > > On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:35 PM, Brent Meeker > > <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: > >> Rex Allen wrote: > >>> What is your alternative to the "everything" universal acid? That > >>> things just are the way they are (uniquely), and there's > >>> ultimately no > >>> explanation for that. Right? > >>> > >> > >> Exactly so. "It's just happened that way" and "Everything happens > >> and > >> so this happens too." are both equally useless. Progress is only > >> made > >> when we can explain why this rather than that. > > > > So, we have our observations, and we want to explain them, so we need > > some context to place them in. So we postulate the existence of an > > external universe. But then we want to explain what we see in this > > external universe, and the only option is to postulate the existence > > of a multiverse. > > > > Nothing can be explained in terms of only itself. To explain it, you > > have to place it in the context of something larger. Otherwise, no > > explanation is possible, you just have to say, "this is the way it is > > because that's the way it is." > > > > Right? > > > > Basically there's only two way the process can end. Two possible > > answers to the question of "Why is the universe this way instead of > > some other way?": > > > > 1) Because things just are the way they are, and there's no further > > explanation possible. > > 2) Because EVERYTHING happens, and so this was inevitable in that > > larger context of "everything". > > > > What other option is there, do you think? > > Well in this list we follow the option "2". (As its name indicates). > To progress we need to make the everything idea more precise. Most > naive "everything idea" are either trivial and non informative, or can > be shown inconsistent. > QM is an amazing everything theory, astoundingly accurate. Yet it is > based on comp (or variety of comp), which means that if you take > serioulsy the first person experiences into consideration, then you > have to derive the Schroedinger waves from a deeper purely > arithmetical derivation. > But with the computable, something happens: the discovery of the > universal machine (accepting Church's thesis). > This makes enough to confront all universal machine, actually the > Löbian one will even understand why", with a "consciousness/reality" > problem, or first-person/third person relation problem, and that the > Löbian machine can develop the means to explore the many gaps which > exists there. > > > > > > > > > > >>> So we can take our observations of the world around us and > >>> construct a > >>> narrative that is consistent with what we see...a narrative that > >>> involves big bangs and electrons. But what caused the big bang? > >>> Why > >>> do electrons have the particular properties that they have? If you > >>> propose a particular cause for these things, what caused that cause? > >>> > >>> How is that better than a narrative that allows for "everything"? > >>> They would seem to have equal explanatory power. Which is to say: > >>> zero. > >> We have much evidence about the big bang and some theories as to > >> how it > >> may have happened which are testable. > > > > So the existence of a big bang event certainly seems consistent with > > our observations. But so does the idea of a Boltzmann style > > statistical fluctuation from thermal equilibrium. Or the idea that > > this is just the dream of the infinitude of relations between numbers. > > > > We construct narratives that are consistent with our observations, but > > these narratives are about our observations, not about what really > > exists. You seem to have jumped to some unfounded ontological > > conclusions. > > > > You can talk about big bangs if that helps you think about your > > observations, helps you identify patterns in what you experience. > > But, that's as far as it can reasonably go, right? > > > > At the end of the day, we're always right back at where we > > started...with our observations...with our subjective conscious > > experience. > > I think we have made progress. We "know" (assuming digital mechanism) > that we know nothing about the consequence of addition and > multiplication, but that we can explore, and that it is divided into > sharable and non sharable parts. > > We may correct a widespread error: the sharable part is the objective > and doubtable part, the non sharable part is the subjective and > undoubtable part. > > We have a theology. A "greek" one, by which I mean, that is the bad > news for some, we have to do mathematics. > > And nobody ask you to believe it, unless you decide to say "yes" to > some doctor and believe that 2 + 2 = 4. > > You can call it a toy theology, given that it is the theology of an > ideally relatively self-referentially correct Löbian machine. It > exists as a branch of math, and it applies to us if comp is true and > as far as we are correct ourselves, which we can never known. But we > can bet on levels, like "nature" apparently already did, and prey or > hope or something like that. > > The quest of truth will continue. If comp is true reality is beyond > fictions. For the best or the worth, this depends *partially* on us. > Who "us"? "Us" the universal machines. > > The motto: be vigilant toward any *form* of authoritative argument, > even those of nature. Eventually it is a matter of personal freedom, > but it is far better to get the personal understanding in those > matter. All universal machine "soon or later" understands this. > > Bruno Marchal > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.