On 21 Dec 2009, at 22:33, Nick P wrote:

> Thank you quentin and Bruno...
> Right  I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the
> copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however
> technically problematic.  I think I get part of what you say Bruno.
> What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to
> extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying
> process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many
> times) by the UD.

Yes. Even if the level is given by the (rational) quantum state of the  
entire Milky Way, in term of strings and branes, the UD will generate  
an infinity of computations going through that state.

Robinson Arithmetic (very weak yet "Turing universal") proves the  
existence of all those computations, and relative computation. By  
first person indeterminacy "we (wetvare)" belongs to an infinity of  

> Hence by it generating all possible emulations of
> me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any
> stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next
> OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current
> wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already
> software constructs in a simulation).

This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view  
point, you can expect anything. Perhaps.

But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect  
the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the  
UD going through your current state. You have to take into account the  
first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary  
arithmetic, combinators, etc.).

That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well verified)  
quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from elementary  
arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- 
Smullyan sense).
The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential  
correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of the  
reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude).

We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or  
whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative  
variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many  
universal machines.

In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines  


> On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/12/21 Nick P <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>
>>> Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and  
>>> Sensations”
>>> that  “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting
>>> process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine,
>>> given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and
>>> the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different
>>> places, for example Washington and Moscow”.
>>> However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this
>>> might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure  
>>> just a
>>> passive reading is possible.  Bruno gives the footnote below.
>>>  “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine  
>>> emulating
>>> some unitary transformation in case the
>>> brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics.
>>> This recall that quantum computer does not
>>> violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist
>>> form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the
>>> brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine
>>> Turing state, it can be recopied, without
>>> violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”.
>>> The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial
>>> state to operate on in order to enable evolution.  This initial  
>>> state
>>> must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain
>>> configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure
>>> that the no clone theorem can be overcome here?
>>> You're anticipating "how this could be done on humans". But the
>>> argument is done by taking for granted that "we"/consciousness can
>>> be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So
>>> let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something
>>> else as "wetware" with input/output system that permits easy access
>>> to the current computational state.
>>> The fact that we would be "turing emulable" does not entails that it
>>> is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing
>>> the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible
>>> (even at the expense of destructing the "original") then after that
>>> data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact
>>> that the "original" would have been destroyed in the copying process
>>> doesn't matter.
>> That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one  
>> that a
>> quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So,
>> despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can
>> actually "prepare" them (in the quantum sense of "preparation") in
>> many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal  
>> dovetailer
>> generate those "preparations" infinitely often. The universal
>> dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate
>> all rational possible quantum states.
>> Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all
>> decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum "preparable", but
>> in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are
>> working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum
>> mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the
>> decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine
>> either).
>> Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece
>> of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from
>> an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not
>> ( priori) digitally emulable.
>> Bruno
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
>> - Show quoted text -
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