On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: >>> Hence by it generating all possible emulations of >>> stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my >>> next >>> OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current >>> wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already >>> software constructs in a simulation). > > >> This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view >> point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. > > Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is > weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all > please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By > comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be > simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is > running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the > underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then > fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying. Now If I want > to be teleported from Brussels to Moskow then sufficient information > must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be > possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state > in Brussels destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was > properly copied. Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded > data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes > impossible. What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at > least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could > exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of > exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built.
OK. (and then step 8 explains why the initial universe is no more useful, the arithmetical UD is enough). Also, it is perhaps always one next 1-observer moment, but also always an infinity of 3-observer moments. The UD is terribly redundant, and anything it does, it will repeat it infinitely often. A compactification of it looks really like the border of the Mandelbrot set. The closer you look, the more complex it appears. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9iOORSU9zk > Once built then > there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including > the milky way if this level of entanglement is to be necessary to > adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my > consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next > Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells). Infinitely one. "in the UD" means "third person describable (in principle) by an outside observers". The probable next 1-moment is a winner among those 3-moments. > > >> But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect >> the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the >> UD going through your current state. You have to take into account >> the >> first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary >> arithmetic, combinators, etc.). > > As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible > world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension > which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but > it will be a long way into the future. This is like your delay > scenario in the SANE paper. Yes, and we cannot be aware of those delays. And the step 8 discharges the need of the "robust concrete universe". A tiny part of arithmetical truth will play that role. > >> That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well >> verified) >> quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from >> elementary >> arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- >> Smullyan sense). >> The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential >> correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of >> the >> reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude). > > Hmmm. I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this. It is normal. You need to read Gödel 1931, Löb, 1955, Solovay 1976, + Everett 1957. (and the needed books or courses). It is why I separate UDA from AUDA. UDA needs some amount of familiarity with computers, but AUDA needs mathematical logics (which is not very well known). > > >> We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or >> whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative >> variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many >> universal machines. >> In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines >> compete. > > Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that > there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we > know)? Any UD generates all other UDs, infinitely often. It is really like the mandelbrot set. > > I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a > spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as > indicated by your last sentence. > > > I am very grateful for your comments. Forgive me if I am not quick at > picking things up but I have swopped fields to some extent and I am > finding this area fascinating but difficult! It is not easy at all. You are welcome, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.