On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote:

>>> Hence by it generating all possible emulations of
>>> stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my  
>>> next
>>> OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current
>>> wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already
>>> software constructs in a simulation).
>> This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view
>> point, you can expect anything. Perhaps.
> Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is
> weird.  Perhaps I have not explained myself very well.  First of all
> please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By
> comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be
> simulated on some form of computer.  Currently my consciousness is
> running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware).  If the
> underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then
> fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying.  Now If I want
> to be teleported from Brussels  to Moskow then sufficient information
> must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be
> possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state
> in Brussels  destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was
> properly copied.  Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded
> data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes
> impossible.  What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at
> least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could
> exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of
> exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built.

OK. (and then step 8 explains why the initial universe is no more  
useful, the arithmetical UD is enough).
Also, it is perhaps always one next  1-observer moment, but also  
always an infinity of 3-observer moments. The UD is terribly  
redundant, and anything it does, it will repeat it infinitely often. A  
compactification of it looks really like the border of the Mandelbrot  
set. The closer you look, the more complex it appears.

> Once built then
> there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including
> the milky way if this  level of entanglement is to be necessary to
> adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my
> consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next
> Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells).

Infinitely one. "in the UD" means "third person describable (in  
principle) by an outside observers".
The probable next 1-moment is a winner among those 3-moments.

>> But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect
>> the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the
>> UD going through your current state. You have to take into account  
>> the
>> first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary
>> arithmetic, combinators, etc.).
> As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible
> world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension
> which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but
> it will be a long way into the future.  This is like your delay
> scenario in the SANE paper.

Yes, and we cannot be aware of those delays. And the step 8 discharges  
the need of the "robust concrete universe". A tiny part of  
arithmetical truth will play that role.

>> That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well  
>> verified)
>> quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from  
>> elementary
>> arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb-
>> Smullyan sense).
>> The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential
>> correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of  
>> the
>> reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude).
> Hmmm.  I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this.

It is normal. You need to read Gödel 1931, Löb, 1955, Solovay 1976, +  
Everett 1957. (and the needed books or courses). It is why I separate  
UDA from AUDA. UDA needs some amount of familiarity with computers,  
but AUDA needs mathematical logics (which is not very well known).

>> We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or
>> whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative
>> variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many
>> universal machines.
>> In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines
>> compete.
> Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that
> there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we
> know)?

Any UD generates all other UDs, infinitely often.
It is really like the mandelbrot set.

> I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a
> spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as
> indicated by your last sentence.
> I am very grateful for your comments.  Forgive me if I am not quick at
> picking things up but I have swopped fields to some extent and I am
> finding this area fascinating but difficult!

It is not easy at all. You are welcome,




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