>> Hence by it generating all possible emulations of >>stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next > >OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current > >wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already > >software constructs in a simulation).

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>This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view >point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying. Now If I want to be teleported from Brussels to Moskow then sufficient information must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state in Brussels destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was properly copied. Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes impossible. What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built. Once built then there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including the milky way if this level of entanglement is to be necessary to adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells). >But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect >the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the >UD going through your current state. You have to take into account the >first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary >arithmetic, combinators, etc.). As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but it will be a long way into the future. This is like your delay scenario in the SANE paper. >That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well verified) >quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from elementary >arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- >Smullyan sense). >The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential >correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of the >reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude). Hmmm. I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this. >We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or >whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative >variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many >universal machines. >In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines >compete. Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we know)? >Bruno I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as indicated by your last sentence. I am very grateful for your comments. Forgive me if I am not quick at picking things up but I have swopped fields to some extent and I am finding this area fascinating but difficult! On Dec 22, 3:39 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 21 Dec 2009, at 22:33, Nick P wrote: > > > Thank you quentin and Bruno... > > > Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the > > copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however > > technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. > > What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to > > extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying > > process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many > > times) by the UD. > > Yes. Even if the level is given by the (rational) quantum state of the > entire Milky Way, in term of strings and branes, the UD will generate > an infinity of computations going through that state. > > Robinson Arithmetic (very weak yet "Turing universal") proves the > existence of all those computations, and relative computation. By > first person indeterminacy "we (wetvare)" belongs to an infinity of > computations. > > > Hence by it generating all possible emulations of > > me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any > > stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next > > OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current > > wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already > > software constructs in a simulation). > > This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view > point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. > > But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect > the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the > UD going through your current state. You have to take into account the > first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary > arithmetic, combinators, etc.). > > That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well verified) > quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from elementary > arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- > Smullyan sense). > The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential > correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of the > reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude). > > We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or > whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative > variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many > universal machines. > > In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines > compete. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > >>> 2009/12/21 Nick P <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk> > >>> Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and > >>> Sensations” > >>> that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting > >>> process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, > >>> given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and > >>> the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different > >>> places, for example Washington and Moscow”. > > >>> However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this > >>> might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure > >>> just a > >>> passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. > > >>> “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine > >>> emulating > >>> some unitary transformation in case the > >>> brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. > >>> This recall that quantum computer does not > >>> violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist > >>> form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the > >>> brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine > >>> Turing state, it can be recopied, without > >>> violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. > > >>> The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial > >>> state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial > >>> state > >>> must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain > >>> configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure > >>> that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? > > >>> You're anticipating "how this could be done on humans". But the > >>> argument is done by taking for granted that "we"/consciousness can > >>> be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So > >>> let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something > >>> else as "wetware" with input/output system that permits easy access > >>> to the current computational state. > > >>> The fact that we would be "turing emulable" does not entails that it > >>> is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing > >>> the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible > >>> (even at the expense of destructing the "original") then after that > >>> data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact > >>> that the "original" would have been destroyed in the copying process > >>> doesn't matter. > > >> That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one > >> that a > >> quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, > >> despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can > >> actually "prepare" them (in the quantum sense of "preparation") in > >> many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal > >> dovetailer > >> generate those "preparations" infinitely often. The universal > >> dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate > >> all rational possible quantum states. > >> Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all > >> decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum "preparable", but > >> in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are > >> working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum > >> mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the > >> decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine > >> either). > > >> Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece > >> of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from > >> an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not > >> ( priori) digitally emulable. > > >> Bruno > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - > > >> - Show quoted text - > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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