On Dec 23, 12:55 am, Nick Prince <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
> Hi Bruno
> My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a
> bit of this new stuff as I go along.  Thank you for being patient with
> me.
> However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any
> of these is fundamentally wrong.
> I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but
> will come back to that.
>  Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating.  Comp says it is
> possible to build a "concrete" one and in step 7 of your paper you say
> that the UD could provide infinitely  many possible consistent
> extensions of me.  (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds
> with me in them  as  bit strings)  I quote you from the sane paper:
> "Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate
> all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by
> comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to
> (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible
> (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this,
> with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised
> brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a  DU
> digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we
> don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if
> we make exception of the robust universe."
> Actually the kind of "teleportation" I am interested in, for reasons
> as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to
> moment.  I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the
> time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I
> say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your
> paper).  If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to
> make a decent copy of them.  However, Once the “concrete” UD is run
> then it  computes all possible futures for all possible virtual
> extensions. Then there will be  an (infinitely many) extension(s) for
> the blown to bits person.  The blowing to bits is just the equivalent
> of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps.  So here we have the
> basic quantum immortality thing coming in again.   However, if  it
> takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the
> delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues
> consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d
> person, well - they see the delay.
> Now is the interesting bit.  Because this future UD creates all
> possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man
> then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent
> extension prior to the blowing up!  In other words every observer
> moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but
> any  of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in
> the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe.  In
> conclusion,  from our ist person point of view we do not know whether
> our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a
> simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again.  If the UD can simulate
> all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with
> our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very
> quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world.  We
> never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time
> difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here!
> Hence if a UD is possible, then only the first observer moment(s) -or
> fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real”
> universe at all.  The rest is all simulation.  The very existence of a
> UD implies that we are in a simulation.
> If they exist platonically then it's all simulation and
> computationalism must be necessary rather than contingent.
> It's a very fumbling line of thinking but it helps me to learn about
> things as I go along.
> Best
> Nick
> On Dec 22, 6:41 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote:
> > >>> Hence by it generating all possible emulations of
> > >>> stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my  
> > >>> next
> > >>> OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current
> > >>> wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already
> > >>> software constructs in a simulation).
> > >> This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view
> > >> point, you can expect anything. Perhaps.
> > > Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is
> > > weird.  Perhaps I have not explained myself very well.  First of all
> > > please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By
> > > comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be
> > > simulated on some form of computer.  Currently my consciousness is
> > > running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware).  If the
> > > underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then
> > > fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying.  Now If I want
> > > to be teleported from Brussels  to Moskow then sufficient information
> > > must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be
> > > possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state
> > > in Brussels  destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was
> > > properly copied.  Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded
> > > data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes
> > > impossible.  What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at
> > > least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could
> > > exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of
> > > exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built.
> > OK. (and then step 8 explains why the initial universe is no more  
> > useful, the arithmetical UD is enough).
> > Also, it is perhaps always one next  1-observer moment, but also  
> > always an infinity of 3-observer moments. The UD is terribly  
> > redundant, and anything it does, it will repeat it infinitely often. A  
> > compactification of it looks really like the border of the Mandelbrot  
> > set. The closer you look, the more complex it appears.
> >  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9iOORSU9zk
> > > Once built then
> > > there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including
> > > the milky way if this  level of entanglement is to be necessary to
> > > adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my
> > > consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next
> > > Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells).
> > Infinitely one. "in the UD" means "third person describable (in  
> > principle) by an outside observers".
> > The probable next 1-moment is a winner among those 3-moments.
> > >> But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect
> > >> the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the
> > >> UD going through your current state. You have to take into account  
> > >> the
> > >> first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary
> > >> arithmetic, combinators, etc.).
> > > As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible
> > > world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension
> > > which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but
> > > it will be a long way into the future.  This is like your delay
> > > scenario in the SANE paper.
> > Yes, and we cannot be aware of those delays. And the step 8 discharges  
> > the need of the "robust concrete universe". A tiny part of  
> > arithmetical truth will play that role.
> > >> That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well  
> > >> verified)
> > >> quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from  
> > >> elementary
> > >> arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb-
> > >> Smullyan sense).
> > >> The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential
> > >> correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of  
> > >> the
> > >> reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude).
> > > Hmmm.  I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this.
> > It is normal. You need to read Gödel 1931, Löb, 1955, Solovay 1976, +  
> > Everett 1957. (and the needed books or courses). It is why I separate  
> > UDA from AUDA. UDA needs some amount of familiarity with computers,  
> > but AUDA needs mathematical logics (which is not very well known).
> > >> We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or
> > >> whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative
> > >> variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many
> > >> universal machines.
> > >> In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines
> > >> compete.
> > > Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that
> > > there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we
> > > know)?
> > Any UD generates all other UDs, infinitely often.
> > It is really like the mandelbrot set.
> > > I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a
> > > spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as
> > > indicated by your last sentence.
> > > I am very grateful for your comments.  Forgive me if I am not quick at
> > > picking things up but I have swopped fields to some extent and I am
> > > finding this area fascinating but difficult!
> > It is not easy at all. You are welcome,
> > Bruno
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text -
> > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
> - Show quoted text -


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