On Dec 23, 12:55 am, Nick Prince <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk> wrote: > Hi Bruno > > My background is in mathematical physics but I am trying to read up a > bit of this new stuff as I go along. Thank you for being patient with > me. > > However, I think you have confirmed some things - let me know if any > of these is fundamentally wrong. > > I want to put aside the platonic arithmetical UD for the moment but > will come back to that. > > Just supposing that there is as yet NO UD operating. Comp says it is > possible to build a "concrete" one and in step 7 of your paper you say > that the UD could provide infinitely many possible consistent > extensions of me. (I am thinking of descriptions of simulated worlds > with me in them as bit strings) I quote you from the sane paper: > > "Then, it follows from the six preceding steps that it will generate > all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which (by > comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to > (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible > (locally) emulable environments or computational histories. And this, > with comp, even in the case you consider that your ‘‘generalised > brain’’ (the ‘‘whatever’’ which is needed to be emulated by a DU > digital body/brain to survive) is the whole Milky Way galaxy. And we > don’t need any Science Fiction like devices to make this concrete, if > we make exception of the robust universe." > > Actually the kind of "teleportation" I am interested in, for reasons > as you will see is the usual simple one which takes us from moment to > moment. I am being teleported into the next observer moment all the > time ( if this is because I'm already being computed by a UD then as I > say lets just ignore this possibility for now as you did in your > paper). If someone is blown to bits, then we have lost the chance to > make a decent copy of them. However, Once the “concrete” UD is run > then it computes all possible futures for all possible virtual > extensions. Then there will be an (infinitely many) extension(s) for > the blown to bits person. The blowing to bits is just the equivalent > of the annhiallation part of your earlier steps. So here we have the > basic quantum immortality thing coming in again. However, if it > takes the UD a long time to generate sufficient extensions then the > delay will be considerable before the blown to bits man continues > consciousness - although to him it will seem instantaneous. From 3d > person, well - they see the delay. > > Now is the interesting bit. Because this future UD creates all > possible extensions of all possible states of the blown to bits man > then what’s to stop him finding continuation with a consistent > extension prior to the blowing up! In other words every observer > moment of his life (not just the one just before being blown up - but > any of them) could just as easily be followed by a suitable one in > the virtual UD rather than one in the initial run of the universe. In > conclusion, from our ist person point of view we do not know whether > our next observer moment will occur in the “real” universe or in a > simulated one- this is 1-indeterminacy again. If the UD can simulate > all possible observer moments then it will have those associated with > our very first sense of consciousness and hence we will have very > quickly slipped, without knowing it, into the UD’s virtual world. We > never noticed any delay of course but there may have been a huge time > difference assuming Russell’s time postulate has meaning here! > > Hence if a UD is possible, then only the first observer moment(s) -or > fraction of our conscious lives - were ever lived in a “basic/real” > universe at all. The rest is all simulation. The very existence of a > UD implies that we are in a simulation. > > If they exist platonically then it's all simulation and > computationalism must be necessary rather than contingent. > > It's a very fumbling line of thinking but it helps me to learn about > things as I go along. > > Best > > Nick > > On Dec 22, 6:41 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > > > On 22 Dec 2009, at 18:48, Nick P wrote: > > > >>> Hence by it generating all possible emulations of > > >>> stages of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my > > >>> next > > >>> OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current > > >>> wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already > > >>> software constructs in a simulation). > > > >> This is weird. From some "absolute", non machine accessible view > > >> point, you can expect anything. Perhaps. > > > > Assuming that comp is true, then I am not sure why you think it is > > > weird. Perhaps I have not explained myself very well. First of all > > > please check that my understanding of computationalism is correct. By > > > comp I mean (loosly)that I am assuming that any conscious being can be > > > simulated on some form of computer. Currently my consciousness is > > > running on the substrate provided by my brain (hardware). If the > > > underlying reality is a much more fundamental (unknown) substrate then > > > fine because this shouldn’t invalidate what I’m saying. Now If I want > > > to be teleported from Brussels to Moskow then sufficient information > > > must be coded for my reconstitution later on. This may or may not be > > > possible because it may turn out that the accessing of my final state > > > in Brussels destroys my brain before the detailed brain state was > > > properly copied. Worse still, suppose someone loses whatever coded > > > data they did have of me such that the reconstitution becomes > > > impossible. What I am trying to say is that if comp is true then at > > > least I can be confident that some consistent extension of me could > > > exist in the future provided the robust physical universe you speak of > > > exists such that a suitable UD can actually be built. > > > OK. (and then step 8 explains why the initial universe is no more > > useful, the arithmetical UD is enough). > > Also, it is perhaps always one next 1-observer moment, but also > > always an infinity of 3-observer moments. The UD is terribly > > redundant, and anything it does, it will repeat it infinitely often. A > > compactification of it looks really like the border of the Mandelbrot > > set. The closer you look, the more complex it appears. > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9iOORSU9zk > > > > Once built then > > > there would exist at least one consistent extension of me (including > > > the milky way if this level of entanglement is to be necessary to > > > adequately ensure this is the most probable next state of my > > > consciousness) in the UD which will enable me to experience my next > > > Observer Moment (after the last one in Brussells). > > > Infinitely one. "in the UD" means "third person describable (in > > principle) by an outside observers". > > The probable next 1-moment is a winner among those 3-moments. > > > >> But from your current "here and now" experience, you have to expect > > >> the most probable relative computation(s) (among all generated in the > > >> UD going through your current state. You have to take into account > > >> the > > >> first person indeterminacy intrinsic to the UD (or elementary > > >> arithmetic, combinators, etc.). > > > > As pointed out above, somewhere in the UD there WILL be a possible > > > world (Obs moment) which will best provide the consistent extension > > > which will give me a sense of continuity with myself at Brussels – but > > > it will be a long way into the future. This is like your delay > > > scenario in the SANE paper. > > > Yes, and we cannot be aware of those delays. And the step 8 discharges > > the need of the "robust concrete universe". A tiny part of > > arithmetical truth will play that role. > > > >> That is why, if you prefer to use the simpler (and very well > > >> verified) > > >> quantum theory, the honest mechanist has to justify it from > > >> elementary > > >> arithmetic as seen from the lobian (self-aware in the Gödel-Löb- > > >> Smullyan sense). > > >> The needed mathematical restriction on the ideal self-referential > > >> correct universal machine, makes it possible to see the shadows of > > >> the > > >> reason of the "negative probabilities (amplitude). > > > > Hmmm. I’m really sorry but I’m not understanding this. > > > It is normal. You need to read Gödel 1931, Löb, 1955, Solovay 1976, + > > Everett 1957. (and the needed books or courses). It is why I separate > > UDA from AUDA. UDA needs some amount of familiarity with computers, > > but AUDA needs mathematical logics (which is not very well known). > > > >> We have to justify the stable appearance of the current wetware (or > > >> whateverware) from our being software constructs (numbers, relative > > >> variable numbers) executed (in the math sense) by infinitely many > > >> universal machines. > > >> In a sense, below our substitution level, all universal machines > > >> compete. > > > > Yes I think I understand this bit because you are saying that that > > > there may be (infinitely) many UD’s (already existing for all we > > > know)? > > > Any UD generates all other UDs, infinitely often. > > It is really like the mandelbrot set. > > > > I’ll wait for a response before I bring up a complication which is a > > > spanner in the works which probably you have already pre empted as > > > indicated by your last sentence. > > > > I am very grateful for your comments. Forgive me if I am not quick at > > > picking things up but I have swopped fields to some extent and I am > > > finding this area fascinating but difficult! > > > It is not easy at all. You are welcome, > > > Bruno > > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - > > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -

-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.