> If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive more
> than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical
> level changes.
How interesting!! I had forgotten that most people believe that
consciousness is a classical rather than quantum process (Penrose
excepted). Thank you for bringing this to my attention. So the no
clone theorem should not pose a problem for copy builders after all.
> What do you think could happen if there were 100 copies of you running
> in parallel and 90 were terminated? If you think you would definitely
> continue living as one of the 10 remaining copies then to be
> consistent you have to accept QTI. If you think there is a chance that
> you might die I find it difficult to understand how this could be
> reconciled with any consistent theory of personal identity.
I know. To be consistent with my other assumptions I would have to
believe in QTI but it is just so difficult to swallow. I think the
hardest bit comes when we think of what we would experience. Suppose
I lived in 200BC or before. It's hard to think of ways you could keep
on surviving apart from alien visitations with copying machines etc.
This is one reason I have looked in some detail into Tiplers omega
point theory. I don't think this should be written off as being too
whacky just because others have got onto the Tipler bashing
bandwagon. It has not been refuted yet in terms of the accelerated
expansion of the universe or for other reasons which I can eloborate
on - but that is besides the point. If Tiplers final simulation is a
Universal Dovetailer then anyone who has ever lived in the past could
in principle find themselves as a consistent extension in that
simulation. This is one explanation how people could avoid ending up
in a cul de sac branch.
> According to RSSA and the RSSA your absolute measure in the multiverse
> decreases with each branching as versions of you die. According to the
> RSSA this doesn't matter as at least one of you is left standing;
> according to the ASSA, this does matter and you eventually die. The
> only way I can make sense of the latter is if you have an essentialist
> view of personal identity. Under this view if a copy is made of you
> and the original dies, you die. Under what Parfit calls the
> reductionist view of personal identity, you live.
Hmm.. I think that what I am calling absolute measure you think of as
relative measure or something like it. I thought absolute measure was
the total measure of my existence across the whole multiverse. If I
cannot die then RSSA implies this would be conserved. As you traverse
down a particular branch though, your measure would indeed decrease
for both RSSA and ASSA but it would eventually decrease to zero for
ASSA when you died! With RSSA it could only decrease asymptotically
to zero, but never completly disappear.
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