On 03 Feb 2011, at 11:28, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But it gives only all possible experiential realities, and even if
these are by chance consistent with a physical quantum environment
up to a certain point, it is tremendously unlikely that at each
moment they will continue to be so.
If you prove that, and if my reasoning is correct, then you refute
comp (and a fortiori CTM).
Not that I particularly wish to refute comp, simply to understand
the rationale:
Taking a very oversimplified example. Lets say the human visual
experiential reality is million pixel (quick google suggests 576
million). A universal dovetailer must produce all possible
variations of the visual field, 10^12 variations. Clearly, the
majority of these will not correspond to physically possible
environments.
I typically agree. Now, the point is that by the reasoning I gave, you
just cannot postulate physical environments to justify the low
probability of aberrant visual experiences. You have to explain why
the seemingly 'physically possible' from computer science.
Or there is something wrong in the reasoning, 'course. But what?
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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