On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:36, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Hi Bruno,I am a little tired and testy so please forgive me if I am curtand rushed in my response. I have time now to write so I will, butbe warned...

`I appreciate the warnings very much. Thank you. I will display my`

`massively destructive weapon too :)`

This is only an avoidance of the problem by the claim that itdoes not exist, begging the question. I am asking questions aboutinteractions, if you want to insist that only bodies (as immaterialnumbers!) exist so be it.

You strike hard indeed!

`But I think I see your point. After all numbers looks like particles,`

`in the sense that each individual numbers seems not be able to do a`

`lot of things.`

I will keep asking how it is that their static relations generatethe appearance of multiple mutually irreducible 1-p.

`I am the one asking the question. I am not proposing any new theory. I`

`am aware that many MAT appreciates MEC, and even take MEC as the`

`'obvious' theory of mind, and then with a variety of person or`

`consciousness elimination. I show more or less directly that MAT and`

`MEC are epistemologically incompatible.`

`Am the one saying to those who keeps MEC, all right but now you have`

`to derive a phenomenology for MAT, and explanation of where and how`

`the physical laws, or they stable appearances come from.`

`But MEC has a tool, computer science and mathematical logic, which`

`makes possible to already ask a (Löbian) universal numbers his opinion`

`on all that. The measure one is given, in that interview, with`

`motivated definitions, by the logic of Bp & Dp (& p) with p restricted`

`to the Sigma_1 sentences. And "B" might depends on oracles, it does`

`not change the logic (in general).`

It is a part of the searched phenomenology.

We each share a common universe of experience and we, not beingsolipsist, believe that that universe that we can agree and bet onseems to involve interactions between what seems to be necessarilyindependent entities.

Absolutely.

I want to understand how you think that your argument can explainthis appearance?

`The argument is only that IF MEC is true, then MAT is useless. That is`

`why the mind body problem is reduced to a body problem, or to a belief`

`in Body problem. I don't hide the problem, I transform it into a`

`mathematical question.`

`If you keep MEC, you can appreciate the shadow of the answer by asking`

`the universal machines directly on the question.`

`To decipher what they say is a bit like deciphering Hubble images. It`

`is a tiedous task, but I am lucky Gödel, Löb and Solovay and others`

`have done a big part of the job. Solovay's completenes theorem of the`

`logic G and G* of arithmetical (and set theoretical) self-reference`

`has even somehow close the subject for many logicians. The`

`propositional part of the interview is axiomatisable. Solovay's proof`

`encapsulate all the Kleene's form of self-reference, which permits the`

`reader of the universal mind to bypass recursion theory and even`

`number theory. As the little book by Smullyan (Forever`

`Undecided )illustrates well.`

`If you want MEC forces the mind and matter to arise simultaneously (in`

`the logical space of the number's minds). Consciousness/realities`

`coupling arize from the numbers, in many ways. I even think that it is`

`very plausible that the complete distribution of the prime numbers`

`emulate quantum chaos and may be a quantum dovetailer. But even if`

`that is true, to get both the qualia and the quanta, you have to`

`extract it from the arithmetical hypostases (or better if someone find`

`better, but you have to say it in arithmetic if you want inherit the G/`

`G* splits).`

I [SPK] (Screaming and ranting is heard in the background.)Have you noticed that I am proposing a way to model acompetition between computations as a way to solve the measureproblem?

Nice. That's the correct MEC way. I am sorry you have to scream and rant when we agree ;)

`That's my point. Below our level of substitution, matter results from`

`the infinite limit of that competition.`

Reality is the sum on all fictions roughly speaking.

SPK: One idea that could be proposed is that information isa relationship in a triple such that a difference exists betweentwo that makes a difference for the third. I am sure that this canbe put into more formal terms. Turing Machines aside, we are notreally getting to the problem until we have a good set of toolswith which to examine the question of how to determine thesubstitution level of a given system and even if substitution ispossible.[BM] Here I disagree 100%.It is proved that if we are machine, then we cannot define andprove what is our substitution level. No machine can ever knowwhich machine she is. This is what I have called the Benacerrafprinciple in older post (and my theses).For any machine defined as such in a 3-way, the substitution levelis built in the plan of the machine, by definition.[SPK]Your disagreement is with a straw man, Bruno, not with myargument here, although I did use poor wording there. I wasconsidering the physical aspect of substitution, as in the forexample case of replacing biological neurons with silicon chips.Please remember that you are a monist and I am not, so ourdefinitions differ in subtle ways. Your idea of Machine is purelyideal. For me machine has dual aspects, physical and informational.In my thoughts, a machine can have physical substitutability withanother machine under bisimilarity, where the substitutionmaintains the invariance of the informational structure (a CompleteAtomic Boolean Algebra for the classical case of Chu2). We can copyphysical states up to the quantum limit, but we cannot copy theinformation that is relevant to determining the quantum states ofthose machines because of the non-commutativity of canonicalconjugates.There is a difference between information and knowledge,between what is computable by UTM and what is not. I do not see howmy claim is not inconsistent with the Benacerraf principle: (http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg08199.html“if I am a machine I will never KNOWN which one.”; by my reasoningthis follows from the “no outside observers” idea of van Fraassen.If there does not exist a third such that the state of that thirdis capable of being altered by a difference between a pair ofstates of knowledge, then there is no information difference incontent (this is, by the way, the definition of bisimilarity!).Knowledge is like second order information.This is exactly thesituation where my proposed duality vanishes! In the zeroinformation state, there is no differences that could make adifference (per definition!).I assume that I am a machine that requires some form ofphysical instantiation to preserve my sense of identity, myawareness of being in the world, but I cannot know or gaininformation of which ideal machine I am. Questions like “whichphysical implementation is “me”?” is similarly unknowable from 3-pbecause there does not exist a non-trivial 3-p that is a uniquebijection of some 1-p. There are *many* possible 3-p that can beextended from a single 1-p. Your teleportation argument in UDA showthis very well. This claim seems to imply that we cannot gainknowledge of “what it is like be be a bat” without actually beingsome kind of bat and is falsifiable in that sense. My wording maybe ill-formed here, but I am betting that I am correct. <wlEmoticon-smile[1].png>So where is our disagreement? ***[BM]That you seem not to see that MEC => ~MAT without singling out whatis wrong in the argument.Of course you can add a notion of primitive matter as epiphenomenon,but that contradicts the weakest form of OCCAM, if only because wehave no means at all to *interact* with such matter. So why toreintroduce it.[SPK]MERDE! Bruno! Can you read what I wrote previously? OK, let mecalm down.... Is your argument completely independent of Maudlin’s?

`Yes. It is an older publication, and so is independent in that sense.`

`The argument is complete also. You don't need Maudlin. But Maudlin's`

`argument provides informations, and can be handy in front of some`

`objection done to the movie graph. You can also translate Maudlin's`

`Olympia, and Olympia+Klara with the movie-graph, and vice versa. I`

`have a Ned Block like China population computer version of it which`

`can help those distracted by the Boolean graph computer.`

If so, then I need to re-read your papers and posts again. So faryou are only adding lots of sophisticated detail to the Movie graphargument, which I pointed out has a problem.

`The movie graph is mine. Published in 1988. I can hardly add something`

`to it.`

It assumes the classical principle of locality and ignores thereality of the relativity of simultaneity.

`The argument assumes only that there is a physical reality in which I`

`can build digital universal machine, or implement universal numbers,`

`and doctors. It is neutral about the nature of that physical reality`

`(primitive or not) and likewise for the doctors.`

`MEC is obviously local. But locality of the neighborhood is not`

`assumed. And relativity is local in that sense too. And MWI of QM`

`makes QM local too.`

We have an overabundance of evidence contradicting the idea thatour common world and the objects within it obey the principle oflocality when it comes to their properties and evolutions and theexperimental evidence for General Relativity is accurate to manymany orders of magnitude, thus if we are going to make claims thatthe physical world does not exist based on arguments that are strawmen because they are based on assumption in contradiction toexperimentally established facts, we are arguing in bad faith.

?

On the other hand, it is not necessarily a violation of OCCAM tointroduce entities that can be shown to be logically necessary. I amjust proposing that a weak form of MAT is OK, and that your (andMaudlin’s) argument that MEC => ~MAT is unrealistic in that it isbased on constraints that are too strong.

We get a phenomenology of MAT that we can compare with 'natural MAT'.

`It shows at the least a different conception of reality than the`

`Aristotelian one. It might be false, and corrigible. In fact the`

`argument gives a tool for measuring our degree of MEC and MAT.`

`It is flexible because you can propose other arithmetical points of`

`view. As long as you translate this in arithmetical terms, or scheme`

`of arithmetical terms (useful for what is not definable in arithmetic)`

`you get all the power of the G*/G splitting, so that you can separate`

`the truth from what the machine proves, knows, observes, feels, etc.`

Adding a notion of primitive matter as an epiphenomenon is thelast thing that I would propose because it only adds to the problemwe are trying to solve. An epiphenomena is by definition notcausally effective, and so is irrelevant to issues of computationalsupervenience. It does not help us at all to find a solution to theinteraction problem (whether it is between bodies or minds).

Nice.

As Pratt wrote in http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech:“We apply Cartesian logic to reject not only divineintervention, preordained synchronization, and the eventual massretreat to monism, but also an assumption Descartes himself somehowneglected to reject, that causal interaction within these planes isan easier problem than between.”I am having a very hard time not seeing your proposal as asecular form of Divine intervention! I would be a lot more sanguineto your argument if you could show how the divine existence of ARsupervenes sufficiently to explain the interactions betweenconcurrent objects. How does the mere existence of relationshipsbetween numbers provide sufficient structure to supervene all of theadditional structures that we need to define the 1-p of many minds?

`But that is the easy part, once you assume the "yes doctor and Church`

`thesis". The sigma_1 reality (a tiny part of arithmetic) emulates the`

`universal dovetailing. And the universal dovetailing go through all`

`the works of all the effective entities and all their interactions in`

`all effective environments with random oracles.`

`But despite those impressive emulation, the real physics as seen by`

`the observers is defined only from inside and is the sum on all the`

`emulations of the levels below our common digital truncation level (if`

`we take MEC seriously enough).`

`Interaction is not a problem in UDA. Only in AUDA, where it is not`

`clear how to define the tensor product from Bp & Dt.`

While we can point to Goedelian diagonalizations as ansatzarguments, we forget that we can only do this because we have matterto write down our symbolic representations of the strings ofnumbers. Without the support of matter, there is no transitionallyinvariant structure to act as “tape” for our proposed UniversalDovetailing machine because there is no transition to be invariantto! If there is no time or matter, then there is no memory for ourprocessors to read and write from and to. Therefore, we must have atsome level a physical material world.

`This not true. A poet said that a phantom can use a ghost ladder. Once`

`dream are video stabilized, you can write on virtual paper, and`

`virtual paper exist in arithmetic. Just hard to describe in detail,`

`because we are only at the beginning of the interview.`

That does not mean that this physical material would is notdegenerate and that it vanishes in some limit, it just means thatfor the sake of the case of interactions of individual minds,however it is that one wants to define their supervenience, we needsomething that it is like to be a physical material world. .

`Yes. That is what I say: we have to explain a phenomenology of matter,`

`without ontological matter. We cannot postulate matter. Well we can,`

`but we can't attach mind to it. Mind is UD attracted in the second.`

`And nothing changes, which means that matter is an invariant for the`

`first person plural universal machines. Physics get more solid`

`foundations here, physics relies on number theory which is extremely`

`invariant.`

`And then I say: oh look, the universal machine can already talk and`

`can describe its result of self-introspection, and we can extirpate`

`already the shadow of matter and compare with natural physics.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.