On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:36, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am a little tired and testy so please forgive me if I am curt
and rushed in my response. I have time now to write so I will, but
I appreciate the warnings very much. Thank you. I will display my
massively destructive weapon too :)
This is only an avoidance of the problem by the claim that it
does not exist, begging the question. I am asking questions about
interactions, if you want to insist that only bodies (as immaterial
numbers!) exist so be it.
You strike hard indeed!
But I think I see your point. After all numbers looks like particles,
in the sense that each individual numbers seems not be able to do a
lot of things.
I will keep asking how it is that their static relations generate
the appearance of multiple mutually irreducible 1-p.
I am the one asking the question. I am not proposing any new theory. I
am aware that many MAT appreciates MEC, and even take MEC as the
'obvious' theory of mind, and then with a variety of person or
consciousness elimination. I show more or less directly that MAT and
MEC are epistemologically incompatible.
Am the one saying to those who keeps MEC, all right but now you have
to derive a phenomenology for MAT, and explanation of where and how
the physical laws, or they stable appearances come from.
But MEC has a tool, computer science and mathematical logic, which
makes possible to already ask a (Löbian) universal numbers his opinion
on all that. The measure one is given, in that interview, with
motivated definitions, by the logic of Bp & Dp (& p) with p restricted
to the Sigma_1 sentences. And "B" might depends on oracles, it does
not change the logic (in general).
It is a part of the searched phenomenology.
We each share a common universe of experience and we, not being
solipsist, believe that that universe that we can agree and bet on
seems to involve interactions between what seems to be necessarily
I want to understand how you think that your argument can explain
The argument is only that IF MEC is true, then MAT is useless. That is
why the mind body problem is reduced to a body problem, or to a belief
in Body problem. I don't hide the problem, I transform it into a
If you keep MEC, you can appreciate the shadow of the answer by asking
the universal machines directly on the question.
To decipher what they say is a bit like deciphering Hubble images. It
is a tiedous task, but I am lucky Gödel, Löb and Solovay and others
have done a big part of the job. Solovay's completenes theorem of the
logic G and G* of arithmetical (and set theoretical) self-reference
has even somehow close the subject for many logicians. The
propositional part of the interview is axiomatisable. Solovay's proof
encapsulate all the Kleene's form of self-reference, which permits the
reader of the universal mind to bypass recursion theory and even
number theory. As the little book by Smullyan (Forever
Undecided )illustrates well.
If you want MEC forces the mind and matter to arise simultaneously (in
the logical space of the number's minds). Consciousness/realities
coupling arize from the numbers, in many ways. I even think that it is
very plausible that the complete distribution of the prime numbers
emulate quantum chaos and may be a quantum dovetailer. But even if
that is true, to get both the qualia and the quanta, you have to
extract it from the arithmetical hypostases (or better if someone find
better, but you have to say it in arithmetic if you want inherit the G/
[SPK] (Screaming and ranting is heard in the background.)
Have you noticed that I am proposing a way to model a
competition between computations as a way to solve the measure
Nice. That's the correct MEC way.
I am sorry you have to scream and rant when we agree ;)
That's my point. Below our level of substitution, matter results from
the infinite limit of that competition.
Reality is the sum on all fictions roughly speaking.
SPK: One idea that could be proposed is that information is
a relationship in a triple such that a difference exists between
two that makes a difference for the third. I am sure that this can
be put into more formal terms. Turing Machines aside, we are not
really getting to the problem until we have a good set of tools
with which to examine the question of how to determine the
substitution level of a given system and even if substitution is
Here I disagree 100%.
It is proved that if we are machine, then we cannot define and
prove what is our substitution level. No machine can ever know
which machine she is. This is what I have called the Benacerraf
principle in older post (and my theses).
For any machine defined as such in a 3-way, the substitution level
is built in the plan of the machine, by definition.
Your disagreement is with a straw man, Bruno, not with my
argument here, although I did use poor wording there. I was
considering the physical aspect of substitution, as in the for
example case of replacing biological neurons with silicon chips.
Please remember that you are a monist and I am not, so our
definitions differ in subtle ways. Your idea of Machine is purely
ideal. For me machine has dual aspects, physical and informational.
In my thoughts, a machine can have physical substitutability with
another machine under bisimilarity, where the substitution
maintains the invariance of the informational structure (a Complete
Atomic Boolean Algebra for the classical case of Chu2). We can copy
physical states up to the quantum limit, but we cannot copy the
information that is relevant to determining the quantum states of
those machines because of the non-commutativity of canonical
There is a difference between information and knowledge,
between what is computable by UTM and what is not. I do not see how
my claim is not inconsistent with the Benacerraf principle: (http://email@example.com/msg08199.html
“if I am a machine I will never KNOWN which one.”; by my reasoning
this follows from the “no outside observers” idea of van Fraassen.
If there does not exist a third such that the state of that third
is capable of being altered by a difference between a pair of
states of knowledge, then there is no information difference in
content (this is, by the way, the definition of bisimilarity!).
Knowledge is like second order information.This is exactly the
situation where my proposed duality vanishes! In the zero
information state, there is no differences that could make a
difference (per definition!).
I assume that I am a machine that requires some form of
physical instantiation to preserve my sense of identity, my
awareness of being in the world, but I cannot know or gain
information of which ideal machine I am. Questions like “which
physical implementation is “me”?” is similarly unknowable from 3-p
because there does not exist a non-trivial 3-p that is a unique
bijection of some 1-p. There are *many* possible 3-p that can be
extended from a single 1-p. Your teleportation argument in UDA show
this very well. This claim seems to imply that we cannot gain
knowledge of “what it is like be be a bat” without actually being
some kind of bat and is falsifiable in that sense. My wording may
be ill-formed here, but I am betting that I am correct. <wlEmoticon-
So where is our disagreement?
That you seem not to see that MEC => ~MAT without singling out what
is wrong in the argument.
Of course you can add a notion of primitive matter as epiphenomenon,
but that contradicts the weakest form of OCCAM, if only because we
have no means at all to *interact* with such matter. So why to
MERDE! Bruno! Can you read what I wrote previously? OK, let me
calm down.... Is your argument completely independent of Maudlin’s?
Yes. It is an older publication, and so is independent in that sense.
The argument is complete also. You don't need Maudlin. But Maudlin's
argument provides informations, and can be handy in front of some
objection done to the movie graph. You can also translate Maudlin's
Olympia, and Olympia+Klara with the movie-graph, and vice versa. I
have a Ned Block like China population computer version of it which
can help those distracted by the Boolean graph computer.
If so, then I need to re-read your papers and posts again. So far
you are only adding lots of sophisticated detail to the Movie graph
argument, which I pointed out has a problem.
The movie graph is mine. Published in 1988. I can hardly add something
It assumes the classical principle of locality and ignores the
reality of the relativity of simultaneity.
The argument assumes only that there is a physical reality in which I
can build digital universal machine, or implement universal numbers,
and doctors. It is neutral about the nature of that physical reality
(primitive or not) and likewise for the doctors.
MEC is obviously local. But locality of the neighborhood is not
assumed. And relativity is local in that sense too. And MWI of QM
makes QM local too.
We have an overabundance of evidence contradicting the idea that
our common world and the objects within it obey the principle of
locality when it comes to their properties and evolutions and the
experimental evidence for General Relativity is accurate to many
many orders of magnitude, thus if we are going to make claims that
the physical world does not exist based on arguments that are straw
men because they are based on assumption in contradiction to
experimentally established facts, we are arguing in bad faith.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily a violation of OCCAM to
introduce entities that can be shown to be logically necessary. I am
just proposing that a weak form of MAT is OK, and that your (and
Maudlin’s) argument that MEC => ~MAT is unrealistic in that it is
based on constraints that are too strong.
We get a phenomenology of MAT that we can compare with 'natural MAT'.
It shows at the least a different conception of reality than the
Aristotelian one. It might be false, and corrigible. In fact the
argument gives a tool for measuring our degree of MEC and MAT.
It is flexible because you can propose other arithmetical points of
view. As long as you translate this in arithmetical terms, or scheme
of arithmetical terms (useful for what is not definable in arithmetic)
you get all the power of the G*/G splitting, so that you can separate
the truth from what the machine proves, knows, observes, feels, etc.
Adding a notion of primitive matter as an epiphenomenon is the
last thing that I would propose because it only adds to the problem
we are trying to solve. An epiphenomena is by definition not
causally effective, and so is irrelevant to issues of computational
supervenience. It does not help us at all to find a solution to the
interaction problem (whether it is between bodies or minds).
As Pratt wrote in http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech:
“We apply Cartesian logic to reject not only divine
intervention, preordained synchronization, and the eventual mass
retreat to monism, but also an assumption Descartes himself somehow
neglected to reject, that causal interaction within these planes is
an easier problem than between.”
I am having a very hard time not seeing your proposal as a
secular form of Divine intervention! I would be a lot more sanguine
to your argument if you could show how the divine existence of AR
supervenes sufficiently to explain the interactions between
concurrent objects. How does the mere existence of relationships
between numbers provide sufficient structure to supervene all of the
additional structures that we need to define the 1-p of many minds?
But that is the easy part, once you assume the "yes doctor and Church
thesis". The sigma_1 reality (a tiny part of arithmetic) emulates the
universal dovetailing. And the universal dovetailing go through all
the works of all the effective entities and all their interactions in
all effective environments with random oracles.
But despite those impressive emulation, the real physics as seen by
the observers is defined only from inside and is the sum on all the
emulations of the levels below our common digital truncation level (if
we take MEC seriously enough).
Interaction is not a problem in UDA. Only in AUDA, where it is not
clear how to define the tensor product from Bp & Dt.
While we can point to Goedelian diagonalizations as ansatz
arguments, we forget that we can only do this because we have matter
to write down our symbolic representations of the strings of
numbers. Without the support of matter, there is no transitionally
invariant structure to act as “tape” for our proposed Universal
Dovetailing machine because there is no transition to be invariant
to! If there is no time or matter, then there is no memory for our
processors to read and write from and to. Therefore, we must have at
some level a physical material world.
This not true. A poet said that a phantom can use a ghost ladder. Once
dream are video stabilized, you can write on virtual paper, and
virtual paper exist in arithmetic. Just hard to describe in detail,
because we are only at the beginning of the interview.
That does not mean that this physical material would is not
degenerate and that it vanishes in some limit, it just means that
for the sake of the case of interactions of individual minds,
however it is that one wants to define their supervenience, we need
something that it is like to be a physical material world. .
Yes. That is what I say: we have to explain a phenomenology of matter,
without ontological matter. We cannot postulate matter. Well we can,
but we can't attach mind to it. Mind is UD attracted in the second.
And nothing changes, which means that matter is an invariant for the
first person plural universal machines. Physics get more solid
foundations here, physics relies on number theory which is extremely
And then I say: oh look, the universal machine can already talk and
can describe its result of self-introspection, and we can extirpate
already the shadow of matter and compare with natural physics.
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