On Apr 2, 11:42 pm, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote: > On Sat, Apr 02, 2011 at 05:12:28AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: > > > Hi Russell > > I have considered also the possibility that the NCDSC may not > > necessarilly operate simultaneously - this would imply temporary 3rd > > person culde sacs! Just as in Bruno's teleportation experiment, there > > is no reason why the reconstitution of the individual cannot be > > delayed. From the ist person pov, everything works the same and > > continuity is experienced. I'm unsure how this fits in with MWI > > though. Such delays would not be easily accounted for in the state > > vector's superposition. Hence if someone reaches a NCDS event and > > somehow later on they find a consistent extension in a simulation of > > some sort, then what happens to the temporary branch cul de sac in > > terms of a quantum mechanical explanation? > > > Nick Prince > > It doesn't really make sense to say 3rd person cul-de-sacs. These would be > just regular deaths, as we see all around us, all the time. > > When you say temporary cul-de-sacs, do you mean after which there is > some kind of amnesia, and then you follow a non cul-de-sac history? If > these really existed, then I would say the NCDS conjecture is refuted, > and QTI, stricto-sensu, is false. But, its going to be hard to come up > with such a scenario. The best I could do was after decapitation, > there are reports of some people indicating they're still conscious > seconds later. But even these scenarios are not immune to the waking > up after a dream explanation. > > Cheers > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -
Hi Russell Hi Russell Sorry I'm not making it clear what I meant – but I think I may have got a handle on it now. I was thinking about Bruno’s thought experiment. Suppose I am encoded in Brussels, my original is destroyed and I am reconstituted in Moscow and Washington. The reconstitution in Moscow is immediate, but in Washington, it takes place after a delay of a year or so. Now this single universe process is assumed to carry over into the case of a universe which splits via MWI, at an appropriate time, into one where I survive some disaster and another in which I do not. But suppose in the one where I do not survive, the medics manage to make a copy of me which gets activated a year or so later. This then mirrors Bruno’s experiment. Now I think I was getting mixed up about Microscopic and macroscopic things and thought that somehow this violated QM in some way. However as long as the copying process produces an “appropriate” Hamiltonian representing the “me” which is sufficient to encapsulate what was essentially my consciousness and “state” prior to the split, then the gap should be just the same as in Bruno’s example. Would you (anyone) disagree? What constitutes an appropriate Hamiltonian of me is another issue, but in principle this is what I am thinking is the way to approach the two parallel situations. Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
