On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:
> I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, which is a
> consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you already defend the
> idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) platonia.
> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal dovetailer. (UDA
> is the argument that comp makes elementary arithmetic, or any sigma_1
> complete theory, the theory of everything. Quanta and qualia are justified
> from inside, including their incommunicability.
By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which is more
accurately described as subjective idealism:
I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.
> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.
> I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that this is
> very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but solipsism is "I am
> dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all numbers are dreaming", and a
> real sharable physical reality emerges from gluing properties of those
You are right, I should find a less general term. It is the missing of the
glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp from the
immaterialism of Berkely.
>> > If by representation you mean the representation of consciousness, then
>> > is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell.
>> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are.
>> I say the opposite. Representation is something you do, which is so
>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the
>> explanation for everything.
> You should read this
> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what they are
> that is important in a mind.
> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes the
> functions are Turing emulable)
> I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy form of
> computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). It is fuzzy
> because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we cannot know which
> machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you need an act of faith
> beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense functionalism is a specific
> form of computationalism because functionalist assumes by default some high
> level of comp. They are just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware
> of the tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical
> computer scientists.
> Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, from
> you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the (immaterial)
> person, not the body. A body is already a representation of you, relatively
> to some universal numbers.
> In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, then
> 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". He has to
> bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, once we accept
> comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" has already bet on it,
> given that the genome is digital relatively to chemistry, and given the
> evidences for evolution, and our very deep history.
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