"If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, show
us the dependence."

We must be confused, or I must be confused.... because you are way to clever
to not get what seems so simple and straightforward to me.... so there must
be some kind of confusion....

because I would respond to this by saying: the dependence is, if there was
no human thought, there would be no such statement.

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 04 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>
>  "it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
>> numbers. "
>>
>> how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of
>> human thought?
>>
>
> I assume Robinson arithmetic, like all scientists. Nothing less, and
> surpringly (that is the result) we cannot need anything more, once we take
> the mechanist hypothesis seriously enough (like when saying "yes" to a
> digitalist surgeon).
>
> If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, show
> us the dependence.
>
>
>
>
>> are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination,
>> thought, and figures?
>>
>
> Yes. They are usually conceive in that way.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>>  On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>>  I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism,
>>>> which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you
>>>> already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical)
>>>> platonia.
>>>> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal
>>>> dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary
>>>> arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of
>>>> everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including
>>>> their incommunicability.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which
>>>> is more accurately described as subjective idealism:
>>>> http://en.wikipedia.**org/wiki/Immaterialism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism>
>>>> I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article.
>>> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non-
>>> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the
>>> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either
>>> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist
>>> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and
>>> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually
>>> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind).
>>> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to
>>> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in
>>> angels and fairy tales.
>>> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is
>>> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the
>>> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something
>>> behind our observations.
>>> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or
>>> physics was the fundamental science.
>>>
>>> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where
>>> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide
>>> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to
>>> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which
>>> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of
>>> reality makes only a  re-apparition in discussion through the quantum
>>> weirdness.
>>>
>>> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of
>>> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear
>>> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a
>>> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
>>> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence
>>> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those
>>> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the
>>> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise
>>> (mathematical) questions.
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected
>>> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer
>>> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of
>>> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1
>>> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and
>>> aristotelian) view on immaterialism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that
>>>> this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but
>>>> solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all
>>>> numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges
>>>> from gluing properties of those dreams/computations.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  You are right, I should find a less general term.  It is the missing
>>>> of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp
>>>> from the immaterialism of Berkeley.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always
>>> decide on vocabulary issue later.
>>>
>>> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing
>>> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers
>>> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least
>>> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what
>>> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter
>>> the subject than the old naturalists.
>>>
>>> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by
>>> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that
>>> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with
>>> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and
>>> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those
>>> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or
>>> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if
>>> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of
>>> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization,
>>> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give
>>> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on
>>> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is
>>> there at the start:  G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the false).
>>>
>>> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more
>>> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet
>>> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from
>>> the numbers self-observations.
>>> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem
>>> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic.
>>> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness),
>>> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are
>>> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta
>>> from the qualia, and to relate the two.
>>>
>>> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you
>>> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or
>>> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long,
>>> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high
>>> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has
>>> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are
>>> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to
>>> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified
>>> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of
>>> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the
>>> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers
>>> which might be great of course(*)).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you
>>> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable
>>> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch'
>>> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and
>>> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables.
>>> Unknowns range on the non negative integers.
>>> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique
>>> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60).
>>>
>>> X is in W_Nu iff
>>>
>>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y
>>>
>>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2
>>>
>>> Qu = B^(5^60)
>>>
>>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5
>>>
>>> Th +  2Z = B^5
>>>
>>> L = U + TTh
>>>
>>> E = Y + MTh
>>>
>>> N = Q^16
>>>
>>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +
>>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
>>>          + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)
>>>
>>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2
>>>
>>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2
>>>
>>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2
>>>
>>> K = R + 1 + HP - H
>>>
>>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2
>>>
>>> C = 2R + 1 Ph
>>>
>>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga
>>>
>>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1
>>>
>>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1
>>>
>>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  If by representation you mean the representation of
>>>>>>
>>>>> consciousness, then this
>>>>>
>>>>>> is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>  Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  I say the opposite.  Representation is something you do, which is so
>>>>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the
>>>>> explanation for everything.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  You should read thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Functionalism_(**
>>>>> philosophy_of_mind)<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what
>>>>> they are that is important in a mind.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes
>>>>> the functions are Turing emulable)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy
>>>> form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects).
>>>> It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we
>>>> cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you
>>>> need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense
>>>> functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because
>>>> functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are
>>>> just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the
>>>> tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical
>>>> computer scientists.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation,
>>>> from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the
>>>> (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a
>>>> representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine,
>>>> then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view".
>>>> He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course,
>>>> once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature"
>>>> has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively
>>>> to chemistry, and given the
>>>>
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>> read more »
>>>
>>
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