"If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, show us the dependence."

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We must be confused, or I must be confused.... because you are way to clever to not get what seems so simple and straightforward to me.... so there must be some kind of confusion.... because I would respond to this by saying: the dependence is, if there was no human thought, there would be no such statement. On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 04 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: > > "it emerges from self-observation by relative universal >> numbers. " >> >> how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of >> human thought? >> > > I assume Robinson arithmetic, like all scientists. Nothing less, and > surpringly (that is the result) we cannot need anything more, once we take > the mechanist hypothesis seriously enough (like when saying "yes" to a > digitalist surgeon). > > If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, show > us the dependence. > > > > >> are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination, >> thought, and figures? >> > > Yes. They are usually conceive in that way. > > Bruno > > > > >> On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>> >>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>> >>> I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, >>>> which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you >>>> already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) >>>> platonia. >>>> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal >>>> dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary >>>> arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of >>>> everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including >>>> their incommunicability. >>>> >>> >>> By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which >>>> is more accurately described as subjective idealism: >>>> http://en.wikipedia.**org/wiki/Immaterialism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism> >>>> I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism. >>>> >>> >>> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article. >>> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non- >>> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the >>> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either >>> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist >>> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and >>> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually >>> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind). >>> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to >>> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in >>> angels and fairy tales. >>> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is >>> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the >>> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something >>> behind our observations. >>> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or >>> physics was the fundamental science. >>> >>> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where >>> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide >>> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to >>> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which >>> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of >>> reality makes only a re-apparition in discussion through the quantum >>> weirdness. >>> >>> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of >>> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear >>> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a >>> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal >>> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence >>> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those >>> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the >>> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise >>> (mathematical) questions. >>> >>> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected >>> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer >>> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of >>> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1 >>> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and >>> aristotelian) view on immaterialism. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism. >>>>> >>>> >>> I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that >>>> this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but >>>> solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all >>>> numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges >>>> from gluing properties of those dreams/computations. >>>> >>> >>> You are right, I should find a less general term. It is the missing >>>> of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp >>>> from the immaterialism of Berkeley. >>>> >>> >>> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always >>> decide on vocabulary issue later. >>> >>> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing >>> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers >>> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least >>> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what >>> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter >>> the subject than the old naturalists. >>> >>> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by >>> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that >>> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with >>> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and >>> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those >>> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or >>> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if >>> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of >>> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization, >>> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give >>> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on >>> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is >>> there at the start: G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the false). >>> >>> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more >>> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet >>> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from >>> the numbers self-observations. >>> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem >>> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic. >>> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness), >>> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are >>> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta >>> from the qualia, and to relate the two. >>> >>> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you >>> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or >>> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long, >>> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high >>> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has >>> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are >>> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to >>> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified >>> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of >>> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the >>> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers >>> which might be great of course(*)). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you >>> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable >>> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch' >>> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and >>> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables. >>> Unknowns range on the non negative integers. >>> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique >>> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60). >>> >>> X is in W_Nu iff >>> >>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y >>> >>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2 >>> >>> Qu = B^(5^60) >>> >>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5 >>> >>> Th + 2Z = B^5 >>> >>> L = U + TTh >>> >>> E = Y + MTh >>> >>> N = Q^16 >>> >>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + >>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N) >>> + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1) >>> >>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2 >>> >>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2 >>> >>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2 >>> >>> K = R + 1 + HP - H >>> >>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2 >>> >>> C = 2R + 1 Ph >>> >>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga >>> >>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1 >>> >>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1 >>> >>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If by representation you mean the representation of >>>>>> >>>>> consciousness, then this >>>>> >>>>>> is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell. >>>>>> >>>>> >>> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are. >>>>> >>>> >>> I say the opposite. Representation is something you do, which is so >>>>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the >>>>> explanation for everything. >>>>> >>>> >>> You should read thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Functionalism_(** >>>>> philosophy_of_mind)<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29> >>>>> >>>> >>> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what >>>>> they are that is important in a mind. >>>>> >>>> >>> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes >>>>> the functions are Turing emulable) >>>>> >>>> >>> I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy >>>> form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). >>>> It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we >>>> cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you >>>> need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense >>>> functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because >>>> functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are >>>> just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the >>>> tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical >>>> computer scientists. >>>> >>> >>> Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, >>>> from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the >>>> (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a >>>> representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers. >>>> >>> >>> In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, >>>> then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". >>>> He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, >>>> once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" >>>> has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively >>>> to chemistry, and given the >>>> >>> >>> ... >>> >>> read more » >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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