"it emerges from self-observation by relative universal numbers. "

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how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of human thought? are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination, thought, and figures? On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > wrote: > > > On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote: > > > I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, > > which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you > > already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) > > platonia. > > Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal > > dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary > > arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of > > everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including > > their incommunicability. > > > By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which > > is more accurately described as subjective > > idealism:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism > > I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism. > > Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article. > It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non- > consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the > Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either > mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist > will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and > like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually > approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind). > The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to > solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in > angels and fairy tales. > But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is > before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the > primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something > behind our observations. > The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or > physics was the fundamental science. > > Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where > the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide > that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to > measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which > is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of > reality makes only a re-apparition in discussion through the quantum > weirdness. > > I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of > ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear > (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a > modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal > numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence > of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those > Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the > notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise > (mathematical) questions. > > Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected > at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer > science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of > number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1 > complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and > aristotelian) view on immaterialism. > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism. > > > I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that > > this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but > > solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all > > numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges > > from gluing properties of those dreams/computations. > > > You are right, I should find a less general term. It is the missing > > of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp > > from the immaterialism of Berkeley. > > Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always > decide on vocabulary issue later. > > You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing > only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers > could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least > before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what > happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter > the subject than the old naturalists. > > Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by > self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that > is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with > you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and > those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those > did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or > the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if > not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of > solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization, > and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give > many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on > lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is > there at the start: G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the false). > > Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more > "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet > finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from > the numbers self-observations. > My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem > mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic. > Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness), > (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are > able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta > from the qualia, and to relate the two. > > When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you > aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or > computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long, > and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high > level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has > gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are > already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to > a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified > in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of > numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the > form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers > which might be great of course(*)). > > Bruno > > (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you > remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable > functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch' > result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and > the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables. > Unknowns range on the non negative integers. > By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique > polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60). > > X is in W_Nu iff > > Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y > > ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2 > > Qu = B^(5^60) > > La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5 > > Th + 2Z = B^5 > > L = U + TTh > > E = Y + MTh > > N = Q^16 > > R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + > LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N) > + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1) > > P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2 > > (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2 > > 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2 > > K = R + 1 + HP - H > > A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2 > > C = 2R + 1 Ph > > D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga > > D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1 > > F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1 > > (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1 > > > > > > > > > > >> > If by representation you mean the representation of > >> consciousness, then this > >> > is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell. > > >> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are. > > >> I say the opposite. Representation is something you do, which is so > >> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the > >> explanation for everything. > > >> You should read > >> thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) > > >> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what > >> they are that is important in a mind. > > >> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes > >> the functions are Turing emulable) > > > I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy > > form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). > > It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we > > cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you > > need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense > > functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because > > functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are > > just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the > > tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical > > computer scientists. > > > Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, > > from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the > > (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a > > representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers. > > > In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, > > then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". > > He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, > > once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" > > has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively > > to chemistry, and given the > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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