"it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
numbers. "

how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of
human thought?

are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination,
thought, and figures?

On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:
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> > On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>  
> > wrote:
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> > On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism,  
> > which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you  
> > already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical)  
> > platonia.
> > Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal  
> > dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary  
> > arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of  
> > everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including  
> > their incommunicability.
>
> > By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which  
> > is more accurately described as subjective 
> > idealism:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism
> > I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.
>
> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article.  
> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non-
> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the  
> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either  
> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist  
> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and  
> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually  
> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind).
> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to  
> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in  
> angels and fairy tales.
> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is  
> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the  
> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something  
> behind our observations.
> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or  
> physics was the fundamental science.
>
> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where  
> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide  
> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to  
> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which  
> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of  
> reality makes only a  re-apparition in discussion through the quantum  
> weirdness.
>
> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of  
> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear  
> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a  
> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal  
> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence  
> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those  
> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the  
> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise  
> (mathematical) questions.
>
> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected  
> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer  
> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of  
> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1  
> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and  
> aristotelian) view on immaterialism.
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> >> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.
>
> > I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that  
> > this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but  
> > solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all  
> > numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges  
> > from gluing properties of those dreams/computations.
>
> > You are right, I should find a less general term.  It is the missing  
> > of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp  
> > from the immaterialism of Berkeley.
>
> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always  
> decide on vocabulary issue later.
>
> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing  
> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers  
> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least  
> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what  
> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter  
> the subject than the old naturalists.
>
> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by  
> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that  
> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with  
> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and  
> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those  
> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or  
> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if  
> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of  
> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization,  
> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give  
> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on  
> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is  
> there at the start:  G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the false).
>
> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more  
> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet  
> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from  
> the numbers self-observations.
> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem  
> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic.
> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness),  
> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are  
> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta  
> from the qualia, and to relate the two.
>
> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you  
> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or  
> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long,  
> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high  
> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has  
> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are  
> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to  
> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified  
> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of  
> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the  
> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers  
> which might be great of course(*)).
>
> Bruno
>
> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you  
> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable  
> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch'  
> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and  
> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables.  
> Unknowns range on the non negative integers.
> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique  
> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60).
>
> X is in W_Nu iff
>
> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y
>
> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2
>
> Qu = B^(5^60)
>
> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5
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> Th +  2Z = B^5
>
> L = U + TTh
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> E = Y + MTh
>
> N = Q^16
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> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +  
> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
>           + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)
>
> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2
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> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2
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> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2
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> K = R + 1 + HP - H
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> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2
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> C = 2R + 1 Ph
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> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga
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> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1
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> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1
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> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1
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> >> > If by representation you mean the representation of  
> >> consciousness, then this
> >> > is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell.
>
> >> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are.
>
> >> I say the opposite.  Representation is something you do, which is so
> >> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the
> >> explanation for everything.
>
> >> You should read 
> >> thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)
>
> >> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what  
> >> they are that is important in a mind.
>
> >> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes  
> >> the functions are Turing emulable)
>
> > I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy  
> > form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects).  
> > It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we  
> > cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you  
> > need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense  
> > functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because  
> > functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are  
> > just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the  
> > tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical  
> > computer scientists.
>
> > Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation,  
> > from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the  
> > (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a  
> > representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers.
>
> > In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine,  
> > then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view".  
> > He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course,  
> > once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature"  
> > has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively  
> > to chemistry, and given the
>
> ...
>
> read more »

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