Hey Bruno,

Thanks for your comments... I'm a little clearer now on your stance on
consciousness and intelligence, I think. I have a few more questions
and concerns.

Regarding consciousness, my biggest concern is that you're not really
explaining consciousness, so much as describing it. To be sure, the
mathematical/logical framework you elucidate that captures aspects of
1st/3rd person distinctions is remarkable, and as far as I know, the
first legitimate attempt to do so.  But if we're talking TOE, then an
explanation of consciousness is required.

Using the descriptor Bp to signify a machine M's ability to prove p is
fine. But it does not explain how it proves p.  Ditto for the
induction axioms; Löbian machines are mere descriptions, absent
explanations of how a machine could be constructed that would have the
ability to perform those operations. Taking the biological as an
example, it is self-evident that we humans can talk about and evaluate
our beliefs. But until we have an explanation for *how* we do that at
some level below the psychological, we're still just dealing with
descriptions, not explanations. Taking the abstract step towards
logical frameworks helps in terms of precision, for sure. But as soon
as you invoke descriptors like Bp there's an element of "and then the
magic happens."  Believe me, I'm not expecting source code, so much as
a clarification that we don't quite have a TOE yet.

Moving on, one technical question I have is how you get the basis for
quanta/qualia distinction - namely the property of noncommunicability.
Unfortunately I probably won't understand the answer as the Solovay
logics are beyond me... but I hope to be able to understand how
noncommunicability manifests as a logical property of a machine.

Another concern I have is that there seems to me a lot of imprecision
in the language used to correlate the consequences of the Löbian
machine with the folk-psychological terms we all use. For instance,
I've seen you refer to Bp in separate contexts as M's ability to prove
p, and as M "believing" proposition p. That is confusing precisely
because proof and belief are actually opposed in certain
human-psychological contexts, such as belief in god. This concern
extends to the language you invoke in your "discourse with Löbian
machines" which I feel takes a lot of liberties with
anthropomorphizing, and sneaks in a lot of folk-psychological
concepts. Giving you the benefit of the doubt, I understand that
evangelizing these ideas means being able to make non-technical
analogies in the interest of accessibility. But it is also possible
that in one context you mean Bp to mean "prove" and in another you
mean Bp to "believe" in semantically non-identical ways, and this lets
you "cover more ground" in making the leap to the aspects of
consciousness that we can analogize from. In other words, imprecise
language may allow you to claim a more comprehensive mapping from
Löbianity to psychology than is actually possible.

I see more evidence of imprecision in your willingness to describe
your salvia experiences as totally non-personal. Now, I have no
experience with salvia myself. However, the fact that such experience
is available to you afterwards tells me that some aspect of your self
is still present during the experience, regardless of how it feels.
Contrast this with the experience of a baby, who actually has no
psychological self yet, or an extremely rudimentary one, and tell me
you are able to remember what it's like to be a baby.

My final concern, as I've tried to elaborate on previously, is your
willingness to posit consciousness as a property of a (virgin)
universal machine. For me this is pretty counter-intuitive (which is
saying something because I'm with you on the UDA!). It means my
computer is conscious in some form, regardless of (or in spite of) the
program it is running. And that for me leads to a notion of
consciousness that is extremely weak. It is why I compared it to
panpsychism previously, because panpsychism similarly attributes
consciousness to aspects of reality (assuming MAT) that lead to an
extremely weak form of consciousness that deprives it of any
explanatory potential. In your case at least it is possible in
principle to explain what it is about a universal machine that gives
rise to consciousness (and that, without any recourse to Löbianity or
anything beyond universality).

I realize you're not saying for certain that universal machines are
conscious, and that this is somewhat informed by your salvia
experiences. But for where my head is right now, consciousness ought
to be explainable in terms of some kind of cybernetic organization
that goes well beyond "mere" universality. In my view of things,
bacteria and viruses are not conscious because they lack a nervous
system that would satisfy the cybernetic organization I have in mind.
I am interested in your proof they are universal, btw. I'm also
wondering if you have an english-language explanation of the MGA... I
recall seeing one a long time ago.

Apologies for the length of this response!


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