Hey Bruno, Thanks for your comments... I'm a little clearer now on your stance on consciousness and intelligence, I think. I have a few more questions and concerns.
Regarding consciousness, my biggest concern is that you're not really explaining consciousness, so much as describing it. To be sure, the mathematical/logical framework you elucidate that captures aspects of 1st/3rd person distinctions is remarkable, and as far as I know, the first legitimate attempt to do so. But if we're talking TOE, then an explanation of consciousness is required. Using the descriptor Bp to signify a machine M's ability to prove p is fine. But it does not explain how it proves p. Ditto for the induction axioms; Löbian machines are mere descriptions, absent explanations of how a machine could be constructed that would have the ability to perform those operations. Taking the biological as an example, it is self-evident that we humans can talk about and evaluate our beliefs. But until we have an explanation for *how* we do that at some level below the psychological, we're still just dealing with descriptions, not explanations. Taking the abstract step towards logical frameworks helps in terms of precision, for sure. But as soon as you invoke descriptors like Bp there's an element of "and then the magic happens." Believe me, I'm not expecting source code, so much as a clarification that we don't quite have a TOE yet. Moving on, one technical question I have is how you get the basis for quanta/qualia distinction - namely the property of noncommunicability. Unfortunately I probably won't understand the answer as the Solovay logics are beyond me... but I hope to be able to understand how noncommunicability manifests as a logical property of a machine. Another concern I have is that there seems to me a lot of imprecision in the language used to correlate the consequences of the Löbian machine with the folk-psychological terms we all use. For instance, I've seen you refer to Bp in separate contexts as M's ability to prove p, and as M "believing" proposition p. That is confusing precisely because proof and belief are actually opposed in certain human-psychological contexts, such as belief in god. This concern extends to the language you invoke in your "discourse with Löbian machines" which I feel takes a lot of liberties with anthropomorphizing, and sneaks in a lot of folk-psychological concepts. Giving you the benefit of the doubt, I understand that evangelizing these ideas means being able to make non-technical analogies in the interest of accessibility. But it is also possible that in one context you mean Bp to mean "prove" and in another you mean Bp to "believe" in semantically non-identical ways, and this lets you "cover more ground" in making the leap to the aspects of consciousness that we can analogize from. In other words, imprecise language may allow you to claim a more comprehensive mapping from Löbianity to psychology than is actually possible. I see more evidence of imprecision in your willingness to describe your salvia experiences as totally non-personal. Now, I have no experience with salvia myself. However, the fact that such experience is available to you afterwards tells me that some aspect of your self is still present during the experience, regardless of how it feels. Contrast this with the experience of a baby, who actually has no psychological self yet, or an extremely rudimentary one, and tell me you are able to remember what it's like to be a baby. My final concern, as I've tried to elaborate on previously, is your willingness to posit consciousness as a property of a (virgin) universal machine. For me this is pretty counter-intuitive (which is saying something because I'm with you on the UDA!). It means my computer is conscious in some form, regardless of (or in spite of) the program it is running. And that for me leads to a notion of consciousness that is extremely weak. It is why I compared it to panpsychism previously, because panpsychism similarly attributes consciousness to aspects of reality (assuming MAT) that lead to an extremely weak form of consciousness that deprives it of any explanatory potential. In your case at least it is possible in principle to explain what it is about a universal machine that gives rise to consciousness (and that, without any recourse to Löbianity or anything beyond universality). I realize you're not saying for certain that universal machines are conscious, and that this is somewhat informed by your salvia experiences. But for where my head is right now, consciousness ought to be explainable in terms of some kind of cybernetic organization that goes well beyond "mere" universality. In my view of things, bacteria and viruses are not conscious because they lack a nervous system that would satisfy the cybernetic organization I have in mind. I am interested in your proof they are universal, btw. I'm also wondering if you have an english-language explanation of the MGA... I recall seeing one a long time ago. Apologies for the length of this response! Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.