Hi Terren,

On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:51, terren wrote:

I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our ongoing

To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand how you make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to human

Well, this should follow (intuitively) from the UDA. Humans are abstract being themselves.

I now have an argument that I think formalizes this

First, I grant that the computation at the neuron-level is at least
universal, since neurons are capable of addition and multiplication, and as you say, these are the only operations a machine is required to be able to perform to be considered universal. I could even see how neural computation may be Löbian, where the induction operations are implemented in terms of synaptic strengths (as 'confidence' in the synaptic connections that mediate particular 'beliefs'). Furthermore, I grant that a kind of consciousness
might be associated with Löbianity (and perhaps even universality).

I will argue however that that is not the consciousness we as humans
experience, and we cannot know - solely on the basis of abstract logical
machines - how to characterize human consciousness.

I agree with this. No machine can know its level of substitution.

Löbian consciousness is to human consciousness like the Escherichia Coli genome is to human genome. Humans and mammals are *much* more complex.

The critical point is that human psychology (which I will refer to
henceforth as 'psy') emerges from vast assemblages of neurons.

But vast assemblage of neurons are still Turing emulable, and that is what counts in the reasoning.

When we talk
about emergence, we recognize that there is a higher-order level that has
its own dynamics which are completely independent (what I refer to as
'causally orthogonal') to the dynamics of the lower-order level.

Yes. Bp is already at a higher level than numbers and + and *. There are many levels. The logic does not depend on the level, but of the correct choice of *some* level.

The Game of
Life CA (cellular automata) has very specific dynamics at the cell level, and the dynamics that emerges at the higher-order level cannot be predicted or explained in terms of those lower-order dynamics. The higher order is an
emergence of a new 'ontology'.

The neural correlates of psy experiences can indeed be traced down to the firings of (vast numbers of) individual neurons, in the same way that a hurricane can be traced down to the interactions of (vast numbers of) water and air molecules. But I'm saying the dynamics of human psychology will
never be understood in terms of the firings of neurons.

That's comp! You are completely right. Note that this is already true for the chess player machine DEEP BLUE. It makes no sense to explain its high level strategy, heuristic and program in terms of NAND gates behavior.

Psy can be thought
of as 'neural weather'.

Yes. Or much above. Psy is not anything capable of being entirely described by 3-things in general, given that it refers to person points of view, like the Bp & p is not describable in the whole of arithmetic.

True understanding of psy may one day be enabled by
an understanding of the dynamics of the structures that emerge from the neuronal level, in the same way that weather forecasters understand the
weather in terms of the dynamics of low/high pressure systems, fronts,
troughs, jet-streams, and so on.

That is what psychologists try to do. They are 100% right in their critics of neuronal reductionism.

To put this in more mathematical terms, propositions about psy are not
expressible in the 'machine language' of neurons.

Nor is any of the arithmetical hypostases, except for Bp and Bp & Dt. Those are exceptional, and no machine can recognize them in those views. That is why the 1-I (Bp & p) has to make a risky bet when saying "yes" to the doctor. The machine will bet on some level where Bp is equivalent with Bp & p. That bet is probably counter-intuitive for the machine.

Propositions about 'psy'
are in fact intrinsic to the particular 'program' that the neural machinery runs. It is a form of level confusion, in other words, to attribute the
human consciousness that is correlated with emergent structures to the
consciousness of neural machinery.

The neural machinery is not conscious, and if it is, such consciousness might have nothing to do with "my consciousness".

What I think is most likely is that there are several levels of
psychological emergence related to increasingly encompassing aspects of experience. Each of these levels are uniquely structured, and in a "form follows function" kind of way, each correspond with a different character of
consciousness. Human consciousness is a sum over each of those layers
(including perhaps the base neuronal level).

That might be true.

Given that the only kind of consciousness we have any direct knowledge of is
human consciousness,

Why human? That is your choice. You could have said mammals, animals, earth creature, Milky Wayan, or Löbian machine, etc.

we cannot say anything about the character of the
consciousness of abstract logical machines.

Why? On the contrary, some are enough simple so that we can say a lot of things.

To truly "explain"
consciousness, we're going to have to understand the dynamics that emerge
from assemblages of (large) groups of neurons, and how psy phenomenon
correlate to those dynamics.

I don't think so at all. Consciousness does not depend on any of its particular implementations.

A little more below...

Bruno Marchal wrote:

If no, do you think it is important to explain how
biological machines like us do have access to our beliefs?

That is crucial indeed. But this is exactly what Gödel did solve. A
simple arithmetical prover has access to its belief, because the laws
of addition and multiplication can define the prover itself. That
definition (the "Bp") can be implicit or explicit, and, like a patient in front of the description of the brain, the machine cannot recognize
itself in that description, yet the access is there, by virtue of its
build in ability. The machine itself only identifies itself with the
Bp & p, and so, will not been able to ever acknowledge the identity
between Bp and Bp & p. That identity belongs to G* minus G. The
machine will have to bet on it (to say "yes" to the doctor).

This seems like an evasive answer because Gödel only proved this for the
logical machine.

Not at all. It works for any self-referentially correct machine. At any level. The very fact that you argue shows that you are enough logical for that. Now "the ideally correct machine" provides a simplification. But the surprise is that even with such simplification we get a surprising rich theology, having physics as a part.

I am saying that we can assume comp but still not have access to the
propositions of a level that emerges from the computed substrate.

We don't. It is a consequence of assuming comp. That is why I insist that comp is a sort of rational religion.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

For the qualia, I am using the classical theory of Theaetetus, and its
variants. So I define new logical operator, by Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp &
Dt & p. The qualia appears with Bp & p (but amazingly enough those
qualia are communicable, at least between Löbian entities).

Doesn't their communicability (between Löbian entities) represent a
contradiction?  I'm not sure how you can call them qualia anymore.

Not at all. Most qualia are non communicable (notably in the Bp & Dt & p logics). It is amazing, hard to prove, but not contradictory (that Bp & p) is communicable. In fine it is normal because it corresponds probably to the qualia of being convinced by a rational argument. that seems communicable, even if we cannot communicate that we have the qualia as such.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The hallucination existence is counter-intuitive because it seems to
imply that our consciousness is statical, and that the time is a
complex product of the brain activity (or of the existence of some
number relation). I thought that consciousness needs the illusion of
time, but salvia makes possible an hallucination which is out of time.
How could we hallucinate that? I see only one solution, we are
conscious even before we build our notion of time.

I don't see why this is counter-intuitive for you Bruno, given that
(assuming comp) all experiences of time as experienced by infinities of
universal numbers are happening in Platonia, which is by definition

But normally the time is an inside view. We don't have access (normally) to the 3-D view of the timeless Platonia. That would be like stepping out of the complete reality, seeing GOD, etc. despite salvia, I still doubt that this is possible, and especially to come back after similar experiences.

The self-consciousness you attribute to Löbian machines does not
require time either, correct?

I thought it cannot not create time, once conscious. Apparently it can, in some hallucinated state. I can't avoid astonishment!

Thanks for you interesting write ups of your salvia experiences...
definitely food for thought.

Thanks. Best,



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